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ABSTRACT
In a distributed wireless system, multiple network nodes behave cooperatively towards
a common goal. Though such assumptions on cooperation are desirable (e.g., controlling
the transmit power level, reducing interference for each other, revealing private information,
adhering to network policies) for analyzing and modeling, certain nodes belonging to a real-
world system have often shown to deviate. These nodes, known as misbehaving nodes, bring
more challenges to the design of the wireless network because the unreliable channel makes
the actions of the nodes hidden from each other.
In this dissertation, we analyze two types of misbehavior, namely, selfish noncoopera-
tion and malicious attacking. We apply game theoretic techniques to model the interactions
among the nodes in the network. First, we consider a homogeneous unreliable channel and
analyze the necessary and sufficient conditions to enforce cooperative packet forwarding
among a node pair. We formulate an anti-collusion game and derive the conditions that
achieve full cooperation when the non-cooperative nodes collude. In addition, we consider
multi-hop communication with a heterogeneous channel model. We refine our game model
as a hidden action game with imperfect private monitoring. A state machine based strategy
is proposed to reach Nash Equilibrium. The strategy attains cooperative packet forwarding
with heterogeneous channel and requires only partial and imperfect information. Further-
iii
more, it also enforces cooperation in multi-hop packet forwarding. To tackle the malicious
attacks, we use Bayesian game analysis to show the existence of equilibrium in the detection
game and argue that it might not be profitable to isolate the malicious nodes upon detection.
We propose the concept of “coexistence with malicious nodes” by proving the co-existence
equilibrium and derive the conditions that achieve the equilibrium.
This research is further accomplished by extensive simulation studies. Simulation results
illustrate the properties of the games and the derived equilibria. The results validate our
design philosophy and clearly indicate that the proposed game theoretic solutions can be
effectively used to enforce cooperation and mitigate attacks.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In a distributed wireless system where multiple network entities (also called nodes) work to-
wards individual or common goals, cooperative behavior among the nodes (such as controlling
the transmit power level, reducing interference for each other, revealing private information,
adhering to network policies) is highly desired for increasing system capacity. Though this
desirable property makes it easy to analyze a system due to state space reduction; in reality,
this assumption might be too strong. For example, there might be nodes in the network
which might act in a selfish and/or malicious manner. These nodes, which are also known
as misbehaving nodes, bring more challenges to the design of the wireless network.
1.1 Misbehavior in Wireless Networks
The research of mitigating misbehavior in wireless network is motivated from the following
example where the network services are disrupted by nodes’ misbehavior. We consider
a wireless network of mobile devices (nodes) operating in an area without any network
infrastructure support, i.e., in ad hoc mode. When transferring packets, the nodes rely
on each other for forwarding packets. Thus, it is very important that all the nodes in the
network act in a cooperative manner. However, due to limited resources (e.g., energy supply,
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computing power) that each node has, the notion of cooperation might not be rational.
As a result, nodes may prefer not to participate in packet forwarding or even worse, they
can, individually or in groups, resist cooperating with the rest of the network. Hence,
noncooperation is a type of misbehavior; the network might become disconnected when
some nodes do not forward packets cooperatively. Therefore, an important question to ask
is how to stimulate or enforce cooperation among the nodes to ensure the proper functioning
of the network.
There are two aspects to this question: i) if the nodes are rational and self-interested, and
only care about maximizing their own benefit, how do we design incentives so that the nodes
are willing to be cooperative and ii) if the nodes do not want to cooperate, how do we punish
them so that the punishment enforces them to cooperate in the future? To address these
issues, we need to analyze what strategies nodes adopt and what actions they take when
they get the packets to be forwarded. Moreover, in wireless network, the wireless channel is
highly unreliable due to noise, multipath fading, interference, etc. A node’s action in packet
forwarding may not be accurately observed by others, or in other words, its action is hidden
from the rest of the network. Thus, the question becomes even more complicated when the
unreliable channel is considered.
This example can be further challenging when some malicious nodes exist. Unlike the
uncooperative nodes, the malicious nodes launch attacks in the network. In the context of
packet forwarding, the attacks can be: intentionally dropping packets, altering the contents
maliciously, and etc. The objective of such malicious nodes is to cause harm and bring
2
disorder to the network; their goal is to maximize the damage before they are detected and
isolated.
In order to minimize the impact of the malicious nodes, detection mechanisms need to be
in place. Thus, a regular node should monitor its surroundings and distinguish a malicious
node from a regular one. However, the detection process has challenges. First, monitoring
can be costly. To identify the malice, a regular node has to listen to the channel and/or pro-
cess the information sent by the nodes being monitored. Listening and processing consume
resources and hence, an “always on” monitoring scheme is not efficient even if plausible.
Second, the malicious node can disguise itself. To reduce the probability of being detected,
a malicious can behave like a regular node and choose longer intervals between attacks.
Third, the randomness and unreliability of the wireless channel bring more uncertainty to
the monitoring and detection process.
In spite of the above challenges, mechanisms to detect malicious nodes can always be
designed. However, the important question is ‘what should the regular node do upon de-
tecting a malicious node?’ Though the reasonable response would be to immediately isolate
the malicious node, there might be situations where malicious nodes can be kept and made
use of. The most straightforward reason for the coexistence is that a malicious node has no
idea whether it has been identified or not, and it will continue to operate like a regular node
to avoid detection. During this time, i.e., when the malicious node cooperates in disguise, it
can be exploited for normal network operations. This “involuntary” help from the malicious
node may be valuable, especially when the network resource is limited. As a matter of fact,
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from the perspective of the malicious nodes, coexistence gives them a longer lifetime in the
network and the opportunity to launch future attacks. As far as the regular nodes are con-
cerned, they have a criteria to evaluate the benefit from the malicious nodes. The criteria
also determine when to terminate the coexistence and isolate the malicious nodes.
To make the process of detection even more difficult, the malicious nodes do not act
passively and wait to be detected. Instead, they also study the interaction they have with
the rest of the network and adjust their subsequent actions accordingly. It is also possible
that a malicious node is wise enough to learn and predict the actions of the regular nodes to
assist itself in decision making. The options available to the malicious nodes complicate the
solution space and most traditional control theoretic approaches fail to find the equilibrium
strategies for both the regular and malicious nodes. In particular, these problems fall more
appropriately in the domain of static and dynamic distributed games and thus the application
of game theory is an elegant way to tackle such problems. It is important that solution
concepts from game theory are used to guide the protocol design process such that nodes
working in a distributed manner can co-exist, even with different intents.
1.2 Game Theory and Wireless Network Design
As far as a node in a wireless network is concerned, its action is accompanied with a cost
or utility, e.g., nodes consume energy in monitoring or forwarding others’ data. It is very
reasonable and intuitive that the nodes are rational (self interested) and the actions of a node,
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in response to others’, are aimed at maximizing its utility. In addition, the nodes adapt their
behavior by learning their utility for each potential action through feedback, which is defined
by the overall objective function of the network. In this way, nodes dynamically react to
changing network conditions, energy budgets, and external stimuli.
Concepts from game theory [16, 38] make perfect sense when dealing with nodes that are
interested in net earnings (utility, payoffs) for the tasks they perform while interacting with
others – be it cooperatively, maliciously or otherwise. In such a distributive environment
where nodes make their own decisions, the utility obtained by a node not only depends on
what it does but also on what others do. Given a set of rational nodes in a wireless network,
the decision whether to cooperate in the process of packet forwarding or how to respond
to others’ actions can be best analyzed using non-cooperative game theory. Moreover, the
underlying unreliable channel makes the nodes’ actions hidden from each other. This es-
sentially translates to an imperfect information game. When malicious attacks exist, the
regular nodes need to detect the malicious ones through a series of interactions, which can
be captured by Bayesian games. Often times, the same game is played for a number of
repetitions (as in the case with packet forwarding), and the observed history may influence
the nodes’ future actions. Furthermore, when the nodes can learn from the results of the
previously played games, as the game repeats, the population of the players taking the same
strategy evolves and it is interesting to find a prevailing strategy.
An important notion in game theory is the equilibrium. It characterizes a steady state
that all the players are satisfied with the payoffs and willing to adhere to current strategies.
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Given different modeling of the games, equilibrium can be characterized with various prop-
erties, e.g., Nash Equilibrium and its refinement Sequential Equilibrium. To mitigate the
misbehavior in wireless network, we are interested in obtaining certain equilibria such that
adhering to the equilibrium strategies leads to the suppression of the misbehavior. However,
the desired equilibria are unique when we take different network settings into account. For
example, the equilibrium strategy under homogeneous lossy channel differs from that under
heterogeneous lossy channel. While the definitions of various games and equilibria are de-
fined in the next chapter, we will give more exemplified explanation when we introduce the
modeling of our games.
1.3 Contributions of this Work
Our main focus in this dissertation is to provide a game theoretic analysis on how to mitigate
the aforementioned misbehavior in the presence of unreliable channels. The interaction
among the nodes in the wireless network is presented by the packet forwarding process which
is further abstracted as a two player game. The misbehavior of the nodes can be categorized
as two types, namely uncooperative and malicious. For the former category, we attempt
to obtain a condition, under which cooperation can be enforced. In the latter category,
the focus is the detection of the malicious node and the strategies after the detection. In
particular, this research includes the following three aspects: i) cooperation enforcement with
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homogeneous unreliable channel, ii) cooperation enforcement with heterogeneous unreliable
channel, and iii) detection and co-existence with malicious nodes.
1.3.1 Cooperation Enforcement with Homogeneous Unreliable
Channel
We begin with the credit exchange system, in which both packet purse model and packet
trade model [10] are investigated. We show that in the former model, dominant strategy
exists while the latter one fails to give enough incentives to foster cooperation. Given certain
incentives, we solve the forwarding game under the general unreliable channel and derive the
probability of packet forwarding that leads to an equilibrium. Furthermore, we extend our
analysis to repeated games; we take several different strategy profiles and find the conditions
under which cooperation leads to subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium. Results show that
proper incentives leading to cooperation are related to the belief of the nodes’ continuous
participation in the game. Besides incentives, a reputation based strategy which generates
actions based on the observation of opponents’ history is also analyzed. It is found that
achieving cooperation with such history dependent strategy does not require any incentives,
even when the observation is not accurate due to the unreliable channel. To address the
prevalence of cooperation, we focus on the resistance on collusion using both repeated games
and evolutionary games. Our findings indicate a subgame perfect cooperation enforcement
strategy ensures cooperation as a prevailing action if it is evolutionary stable or the initial
non-cooperative population is bounded.
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The main contributions in this part can be itemized as follows.
• We evaluate the credit exchange system under the unreliable channel and analyze on
several well-known strategy profiles in which incentives lead to subgame perfect Nash
Equilibrium. Our approaches are general in nature and can be applied to different
strategy profiles and/or payoff matrices.
• We present a rigorous proof on the subgame perfect of a reputation based strategy
(i.e., CORE [34, 35]). We show that such history based strategy does not require any
incentives, and full cooperation is the subgame perfect equilibrium regardless of the
channel.
• We adopt evolutionary game theory in capturing the population dynamics. Analysis
indicates that if nodes are patient enough in the game and value future payoffs, collusion
resistance and cooperation enforcement are equivalent.
• We study the convergence of the cooperation enforcement through simulation. In
particular, we show cooperation can be enforced within the entire population when
cooperative and collusion strategies coexist. The rate the population convergence is
affected by the initial population share, channel unreliability, and the payoff matrix.
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1.3.2 Cooperation Enforcement with Heterogeneous Unreliable
Channel
The problems solved in the previous section require a revision when the heterogeneous un-
reliable channel is assumed. The reason is that under heterogeneous unreliable channel,
every node in the network has different and private observations. This part of the work is
motivated by the state-of-the-art advances in game theory on repeated games under private
monitoring and strategies [7, 20, 21]. We re-model the packet forwarding game considering
noise and show that although nodes’ actions are hidden due to the channel, they can nev-
ertheless monitor their own payoffs. Based on the private observation of their payoffs, we
construct a forwarding approach using a two-state machine. We demonstrate that, through
carefully designing the state transition parameters, sequential equilibria can be achieved to
enforce cooperation. Furthermore, we extend our results to a multi-hop wireless network
and propose a multi-hop packet forwarding strategy to attain the same equilibria. Simula-
tion results reveal that the network is able to achieve better throughput when the proposed
strategies are adopted.
The highlights in this part are as follows.
• We model the packet forwarding process with channel noise as a hidden action game
with imperfect monitoring and propose a strategy profile to the game. The strat-
egy is shown to give a sequential equilibrium solution. Extensive simulations show
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that the cooperation enforcement strategy is more efficient (Pareto superior) over non-
cooperative ones.
• A multi-hop packet forwarding strategy based on the state machine approach is pro-
vided in a general multi-hop wireless network. Our simulation results indicate that
the performance in terms of network throughput is very close to a fully cooperative
network.
1.3.3 Detection and Co-existence with Malicious Nodes
When malicious nodes exist in the network, the modeling and analysis are focused on the
interactions between a malicious node and a regular node. In particular, we formalize the
interactions into two cascaded games. The first game, namely malicious node detection
game, is a Bayesian game with imperfect information. The information is hidden because
the malicious node can disguise as a regular node and the actions are hidden due to the noise
and imperfect observation. The second game, called post-detection game, is played when the
regular node knows confidently that its opponent is a malicious node. In the latter game, the
regular node observes and evaluates the actions of the malicious node, and decides whether
to keep it or isolate it. For both games, we show the existence of equilibria and derive the
conditions that achieve them. To address the possible countermeasures the malicious node
might take, we propose a nested belief model. In this model, the malicious node learns from
its private observations and predicts if the regular node has accumulated enough information
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to make the detection. Associated with the belief, we show that a Markov Perfect Bayes-
Nash Equilibrium emerges. We also provide simulation study to support the efficiency and
other properties of the equilibria.
The main findings can be categorized into three aspects.
• We model the malicious node detection game under unreliable channels as a Bayesian
game with imperfect monitoring and show a mixed strategy perfect Bayesian Nash
Equilibrium is attainable. The strategy profile is also shown to give a sequential equi-
librium solution. Results show how the equilibrium strategy profiles are affected by
parameters like channel noise, successful attack rate, successful detection rate, attack
gain, detection gain, and false alarm rate.
• We propose the notion of coexistence after detection in order to utilize the malicious
node. A coexistence index is designed to evaluate the helpfulness of a malicious node.
We derive the conditions under which a subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium is achieved.
Through simulation, we also show how the malicious node can be used to improve the
network throughput and extend network lifetime.
• We introduce a novel belief about belief model employed by the malicious node. A
Markov Perfect Bayes-Nash Equilibrium is induced when both nodes constantly update
their beliefs. This equilibrium is shown to delay the detection of the malicious node
and help the malicious node actively adjust its strategy to avoid detection. This model
also helps to integrate the detection and post-detection games with effective transition.
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1.4 Related Work
Game theory [16, 38] has been successfully applied to solve various problems in wireless
networks including cooperation enforcement [12, 13, 14, 18, 35, 36, 41], routing protocols
[17, 37, 45, 52] and other system design issues [4, 26, 27, 30, 31, 50].
As far as cooperation enforcement in wireless networks are concerned, mechanisms have
been devised that either stimulate nodes to forward each others’ packets [8, 10, 12] or punish
nodes for misbehaving [5, 9, 32, 33, 39]. Usually, selfish nodes need to be identified and
isolated by mechanisms like Watchdog [32] or Pathrater [33].
Majority of the proposed methods can be generally categorized into two types: incentive
based [11, 13, 41, 51] and reputation based [17, 34, 35]. Most incentive based protocols
assume the network with rational nodes/agents and adopt the concept of virtual currency
(e.g. “nuglets”) [10] which is a method to reward nodes participating in forwarding packets.
It has been well established that pricing schemes (in terms of reward and penalty) [3, 13], and
the security of payment system [11, 12, 51] are closely associated with the incentive based
approaches. On the contrary, in a reputation based system, a node’s behavior is monitored
and measured by its neighbors. Based on the observed past behaviors, a node receives
certain level of services or gets isolated for being non-cooperative [9, 32, 33]. An example
of reputation based scheme is CORE [34], where each node maintains a reputation table for
the other nodes. The reputation value is updated based on the node’s own observations and
the information provided by the other nodes.
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Meanwhile, there have been some interesting developments that use game theory to
analyze how cooperation can be achieved [14, 35, 41, 52]. In [14], Fe´legyha´zi et al. formally
define the packet forwarding game in ad hoc networks and derive the conditions under which
cooperation yields Nash Equilibrium. Michiardi et al. apply game theory in [35] to analyze
several strategies in the repeated prisoner’s dilemma. They also show that in order to
foster the coalition among cooperative nodes, enough incentives should be granted. Zhong
et al. [52] show that there is no dominant strategy solution in a forwarding subgame and
cryptographic techniques can be employed for the required tamper-proof hardware support.
A more general framework on cooperation in ad hoc networks is presented in [41], where
Srinivasan et al. focus on the energy efficiency through cooperation.
However, the aforementioned efforts are not sufficient to completely understand and
model cooperation in wireless network in the presence of noise. The noisy nature of the
wireless channels makes the analysis very challenging. More recent work [17, 18, 37, 47,
49] have called attention to the effect of noise that makes the observation imperfect. In
[17], Jaramillo et al. propose a distributed reputation monitoring based strategy to enforce
cooperation when the channel is not loss free. Their strategy is proved to be subgame perfect
even if the channel estimation is not accurate. Studies on several cooperation enforcement
schemes when channel collision exists are presented in [37, 47], where non-cooperative game
theory is used. In [49], statistical methods are used to filter noise from observation so that
attacks can be identified. Ji et al. [18] calculate the belief of nodes on others’ actions
and propose a belief-based multi-node multi-hop packet forwarding scheme. Li et al. [26]
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further generalize noise and imperfect monitoring as hidden information and hidden action
games, and study truthful routing issues from a mechanism design perspective. Related
investigations are also shown by Feldman et al. in [15].
In spite of these developments, cooperation enforcement in wireless networks with noisy
channel has not been generalized. As a matter of fact, although our work is inspired by
[17, 18], our modeling and methodology is quite different from existing work and should not
be considered as a simple variant. In [17], the implicit assumption is that the channels and
environment are identical around the receiver and the observer; however, in our model, the
channels are assumed to be heterogeneous. Sometimes, the theories and calculations are
too complex [18]. Furthermore, the difficulties in hidden action game with imperfect private
monitoring games are generally two-fold. First, when the noisy channel makes action history
unknown to the public, the games do not possess the recursive structure on the equilibrium
[1]. Second, players (nodes) are not sure about what the opponents are going to do because
they cannot perfectly monitor their actions. In this case, a player must take the best strategy
based on her belief about her opponents’ actions at every move, which is the essence of the
strategies proposed in [18]. However, the drawback of the belief updating strategies is that
the calculations on updating the beliefs are usually extremely complex. Nonetheless, in this
dissertation, our proposed methods overcome such shortcomings.
Recently, much work has been done that investigates the interactions between the regular
and malicious nodes using game theory. Kodialam et. al. formally propose a game theo-
retic framework to model how a service provider detects an intruder [23]. However, their
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assumptions of zero-sum game and complete, perfect knowledge have limitations. Agah et.
al. study the non-zero-sum intrusion detection game in [2]; their results infer the optimal
strategies in one-stage static game with complete information. In [29], Liu et. al. propose
a Bayesian hybrid detection approach to detect intrusion in wireless ad hoc networks. They
design an energy efficient detection procedure while improving the overall detection power.
The intrusion detection game with networked devices are investigated in [54], where Zhu
et. al. introduce an N-person non-cooperative game to study incentive compatibility of
the collaborative detection. [28] models the intention and strategies of a malicious attacker
through an incentive-based approach. The importance of the topology on the payoffs of the
malicious nodes are investigated in [42]. An interesting flee option for the malicious node is
proposed in [25]. In that analysis, a malicious decides to flee when it believes it is too risky
to stay in the network. While the approach focuses on how the flee action affects the result
of the game, it does not consider the noise in observation.
1.5 The Structure of this Dissertation
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we introduce the game the-
oretic definitions and preliminaries. In Chapter 3, we focus on the cooperation enforcement
with homogeneous unreliable channel and anti-collusion games. The findings are presented
in terms of the conditions for subgame perfect equilibrium and evolutionary stability. Chap-
ter 4 extends the research to consider heterogeneous unreliable channel and shows a state
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machine based solution to achieve sequential equilibrium. A multi-hop cooperative packet
forwarding strategy is also presented. Chapter 5 further explores the misbehavior of mali-
ciousness by constructing a malicious node detection game. The solutions in this chapter
show a co-exist equilibrium that malice can be exploited and taken advantage of. The last
chapter summarizes this research and concludes the dissertation.
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CHAPTER 2
GAME THEORETIC DEFINITIONS AND
PRELIMINARIES
Game theory offers power tools in modeling and analyzing conflicts and cooperation among
multiple players in a system with regard to strategic decision making. As a branch of
applied mathematics, it is widely applied to areas of politics, biology, engineering and more.
In Section 1.4, we have shown some applications of game theory in wireless communication
and networking. In this chapter, we formally review some of the fundamental definitions
and concepts in game theory [16, 38, 43] that will be used and applied throughout this
dissertation.
2.1 Game, strategy, and equilibrium
A game consists of players, the possible actions of the players, and consequences of the
actions. Formally, the word “game” is defined as:
Definition 2.1. A game Γ is a triple (I, S,u), where
• I = 1, 2, ..., n denotes a set of players.
• S = ×i∈ISi is a space of strategy profiles. It is the Cartesian product of strategy profile
Si for each of the player i.
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• u is a vector of von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions defined over S. For a
particular strategy profile s, u(s) = (u1(s), u2(s), ...ui(s)) is called a payoff vector
consists of individual payoffs ui(s).
The most fundamental assumption in game theory is that all players in the game are
rational. A rational player chooses actions to maximize her payoffs. In the case the game is
not deterministic, the player chooses to maximize her expected utility (payoffs). The idea
of maximizing the expected payoff was justified by the seminal work of von Neumann and
Morgenstern in 1944 [44]; it is characterize the probabilistic distribution of the payoffs. As
the expected utility is governed by the utility functions, a game essentially describes the
actions the players can take, which are mapped to the consequences (i.e., payoffs) of the
actions by the utility functions.
Since the game is an interaction among players, the payoff of a player (denoted as i)
may be determined not only by her actions, but also the actions of other players’. In this
regards, often times, player i is interested in what strategies the rest of the players in the
game take. We denote the deleted strategy profile s−i = (s1, ..., si−1, si+1, ..., sn). However, it
might happen that in a game, a player’s action is superior to others’, no matter what the
other players do.
Definition 2.2. A strategy s′i is a dominant strategy for player i if ui(s
′
i, s−i) ≥ ui(si, s−i),
for every s−i of the other players’ actions. Similarly, a dominated strategy s
′′is ui(s
′′
i , s−i) ≤
ui(si, s−i). The dominance is strict if the inequality holds.
A game can be solved by iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. However,
not every strategy profile has strategic dominance. Even if there is no dominant strategies,
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a player also has her belief on what strategies other players will take, so that she can pick
her response strategies accordingly.
Definition 2.3. A strategy s′i ∈ Si is a best response strategy for player i if and only if
ui(s
′
i, s−i) ≥ ui(si, s−i), ∀ si ∈ Si\s
′
i.
From the definition above, we can see that if the strategies taken by players are mutual
best to each other, no player would like to deviate from the given strategy profile. The
unwillingness of deviation is an outcome of the game, and it describes a steady condition
that all players reach while playing with each other. To identify the strategy profiles that
lead to the steady condition, the concept of Nash Equilibrium is introduced and defined as
follows:
Definition 2.4. The strategy profile s∗ is a Nash Equilibrium, if
ui(s
∗) ≥ ui(si, s
∗
−i) for every strategy si of player i.
What Nash Equilibrium suggests is a state, that none of the players would unilaterally
change the strategy to increase the utility. Thus Nash Equilibrium brings the game to a
steady state, from which the players would not like to deviate as that would not increase
their benefits any more.
A classical representation of the Nash Equilibrium is illustrated through the famous
example of Prisoner’s Dilemma. The matrix in Figure 2.1 shows the payoffs (number of
years the prisoner will be sentenced) when an strategy profile is adopted, however, in this
example, no communication between the prisoners is assumed.
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Prisoner B stays Silent Prisoner B Defects
Prisoner A stays Silent (1 year, 1 year) (10 years, 0 year)
Prisoner A Defects (0 year, 10 years) (3 years, 3 years)
Table 2.1: Payoff matrix of Prisoner’s Dilemma.
In Prisoner’s Dilemma, “Defect” is the dominant strategy for Prisoner A/B, because no
matter what strategy his opponent takes, the payoff is strictly better (0 year is better than 1
year, 3 years are better than 10 years). Therefore, (Defect, Defect) is the Nash Equilibrium
obtained by iterated elimination.
Another classical Nash Equilibrium example is called the Battle of the sexes [38], as the
payoff matrix which is shown in Figure 2.2. In this two-player coordination game, a couple
prefers to go an evening event together but has not made a decision on which event they
will attend, a Football match or Opera. For the husband, if the wife chooses to go to Opera,
his best response strategy is to choose Opera. When the husband chooses Opera, the best
response for wife is also Opera. Thus, (Opera, Opera) is a mutual best response strategy
and forms a Nash Equilibrium. However, (Football, Football) is also a Nash Equilibrium
point based on the “mutually best” criteria.
Wife chooses Opera Wife chooses Football
Husband chooses Opera (1, 4) (0, 0)
Husband chooses Football (0, 0) (4, 1)
Table 2.2: Payoff matrix of the Battle of the sexes.
20
The above examples show the game with pure strategies. A pure strategy provides a
complete definition of how a player will play a game. Or in other words, a pure strategy
gives deterministic moves of a player for every situation she could face. Apart from pure
strategies, a player can also play mixed strategies. A mixed strategy is an assignment of a
probability to each pure strategy available to the player. The mixed strategy allows the player
to choose randomly a pure strategy, and thus create infinite numbers of mixed strategies from
the strategy set. The Nash Equilibrium obtained with pure strategies is called Pure Strategy
Nash Equilibrium, as opposed to the Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium obtained with mixed
strategies.
2.2 Classes of games
When game theory is applied to model the interactions among players, based on how the
games are played and what the players know, the game can be categorized into different
classes. In this section, we introduce several classes of games that are used in our research.
• Repeated game. In most cases, games are played continuously rather than one shot.
The theory of repeated game is to capture how a player’s actions early on can affect
what others choose to do later on.
Definition 2.5. A repeated game is an extensive form game in which stage game Γ is played
finite or infinite number of times. For each player, the set of actions available in any period
in Γ is the same, regardless of the time or past actions. The payoffs to the players depend
only on the action profiles for Γ in that particular period, and is independent of the time.
21
In a repeated game, we consider the rth stage. Since all the players know the history
hr (perfectly or imperfectly), we can view the game starting at rth stage as a subset of the
original game, and call it a subgame.
Similar to a single stage game, a repeated game can be characterized with the concept
of Nash Equilibrium. However, it is refined as Subgame perfect equilibrium.
Definition 2.6. A repeated game strategy s¯ is a Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibrium
(SPNE) if at each subgame, for all players i
s¯i ∈ argmax
si∈Si
ui(si, s¯−i).
If h¯ is the history generated by s¯, then h¯ is the associated equilibrium path.
To analyze the subgame perfect equilibria in repeated games, One-Shot Deviation Prop-
erty (OSDP) is extensively used. A strategy profile is SPNE if it satisfies the OSDP.
Definition 2.7. One-Shot Deviation Property: no player can increase her payoff by chang-
ing her action at the start of any subgame in which she is the first-mover, given the other
player’s strategies and the rest of her own strategy.
• Perfect information game. A game is called perfect information game if all players
know all moves that have taken place. Formally speaking, any players in a perfect
information game has only one element in her information set, where the concept of
information set is defined as:
Definition 2.8. Information Set is a set that, for a particular player, establishes all the
possible moves that could have taken place in the game so far, given what that player has
observed.
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Perfect information cannot always be guaranteed due to the opacity of the opponents’
actions or the inaccuracy of the observation. In the case of imperfect information, a player
can only conjecture what the other players have played. Hence, probabilistic analysis might
be employed to solve the game.
• Complete information game. Complete information game is a situation in which
knowledge about every players is available to others. Every player knows the payoffs
and strategies available to other players.
Similar to perfect information, complete information may not be achieved all the time.
In an incomplete information game, the players would not be able to know the structure or
the utility functions of the game. As a consequence, they are not able to predict the effect
their actions would have on the other players.
It is worth to mention that complete and perfect information game are two distinct type
of games. The perfect information describe the actions inside the game, while the complete
information states the knowledge about the game structure and goals of the players. A
complete information game can be with imperfect information, for example, in Prisoners’
Dilemma, although both prisoners know the penalty of silent and defect, they do not know
what action the other prisoner takes. Nonetheless, the incomplete information game can
be transformed into a imperfect information game by introducing nature as a third player.
However, unlike regular players, the third player does not care about her payoffs. In our
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modeling of the games, we model the observation inaccuracy due to channel unreliability
as imperfect information game, while we treat the malicious node detection process as in-
complete information game. Bayesian game analysis is applied to transform the incomplete
information game to imperfect information game.
The definitions and terminologies introduced in this chapter serve as the preliminaries of
our design of misbehavior mitigation system. In the rest of the dissertation, we will carry
these definitions. We will also revisit these definitions when we formally define our games.
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CHAPTER 3
COOPERATION ENFORCEMENT WITH
HOMOGENEOUS UNRELIABLE CHANNEL
In this chapter, we use game theory to analyze the necessary and sufficient conditions to
enforce cooperation, especially when a node cannot perfectly monitor other nodes’ behaviors
due to the unreliability of the wireless channel. In particular, we deal with homogeneous
unreliable channel in this chapter. Homogeneous unreliable channel describes the wireless
media with the same loss rates for every transmitter receiver pair. In contrast, A hetero-
geneous unreliable channel indicates the channels are lossy, but with different loss/error
probabilities.
The discussions are based on the packet forwarding scenario in a multi-hop wireless
network. In Section 3.1, we analyze a credit exchange method under a generalized unreliable
channel model and show that the packet forwarding probability can be adjusted through
proper design of incentives, which in turn can be used to attain the desired Nash Equilibrium.
We extend our discussion to repeated games in Section 3.2 where we take several well-
known strategy profiles and derive the conditions under which the cooperation can lead to
a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. In particular, we show how the unreliable channel can
affect the conditions and how a reputation based strategy leads to subgame perfection even
under imperfect monitoring. In Section 3.3, we define the anti-collusion game and further
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investigate collusion resistance and cooperation coalition formation using evolutionary game
theory. We prove the existence of an upper bound on the population share of the non-
cooperative nodes for an evolutionarily non-stable strategy that enforces full cooperation.
3.1 Analysis of Credit Exchange System
The credit exchange system is constructed on the notion that each node gains certain amount
of credits after participating in packet forwarding. These credits, for example “nuglets [10]”,
are transferable and exchanged from one node to another as a payment for packet forwarding.
Moreover, the credits themselves are issued by a central authority and without forgery, so
that the credit can be used as “virtual currency”. As suggested in [10], there can be two
types of charging models for credit exchange: Packet Purse Model (PPM) and Packet Trade
Model (PTM). In PPM, the packet to be forwarded is initialized with a certain amount of
credit. Each forwarding node acquires some credits and forwards the packet to next hop. If
a packet does not have enough credit, it will be discarded. While, in PTM, the packet does
not carry any credit, but is traded for credits among intermediate nodes. Nodes “buy” the
packet from its previous hop with some credit and “sell” the packet to the next hop, with
some increased amount to cover the forwarding cost. A packet will be dropped if no node
wants to buy it. Let us further analyze the node behavior under these models.
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3.1.1 Packet Purse Model
We consider a set of nodes along a pre-defined forwarding path, and form a “forwarding
game”. The strategy profile for each of the nodes is s = (Forward, Discard). We define
the cost to a node for forwarding a packet is 1. The amount of credit (α) a node charges for
forwarding varies according to its instantaneous resource availability, for example, a node
with less energy may charge more than a node with more energy remaining. It is obvious,
α ≥ 1 for the nodes to have incentives to forward. In the simplest form of PPM, a node
takes the credit and forwards the packet.
Lemma 3.1. In PPM, the dominant strategy is Discard.
Proof. For node i, the payoff for forwarding is α− 1, and the payoff for dropping is α. Thus,
all the nodes will simply take the credit and drop the packet. As a matter of fact, since the
first node on the route will drop the packet after acquiring the credits, the packet can never
be forwarded beyond one hop.
It is clear that PPM cannot be directly applied because the nodes will act selfishly and
will have no obligation to forward. Hence, secure PPM (SPPM) was proposed that addressed
this issue by implementing some credit validation mechanisms [10]. In SPPM, the credit a
node acquires from the packet is not valid unless and until it passes the packet to next hop
and receives the validation from the next hop node. We further assume that the transmission
of validation is costless, i.e., a rational node will pass validation to its previous hop because it
will not gain any benefit not to do so. However, due to channel loss, transmission is subject
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to be unsuccessful with probability pe, pe ∈ (0, 1). This loss is applicable to both packet and
validation.
Lemma 3.2. In SPPM, the dominant strategy is Forward if pe <
α−1
2α−1
, Drop if pe >
α−1
2α−1
.
Proof. Since the nodes are rational and they do not obtain any benefit by dropping the
validations, they will only adopt pure strategies. The expected payoff of forwarding a packet
is (α − 1)(1− pe)
2, if both the packet transmission and validation feedback are successfully
transmitted over the unreliable channel. If a node chooses to drop a packet, it might still
get a payoff of α(1 − pe)pe, should the next hop node be “merciful”. In this case, the next
hop node believes that the packet had been forwarded but lost due to the channel, and
nonetheless passes the validation back and is successfully received. The payoff of Forward
is strictly greater than the payoff of Drop if pe <
α−1
2α−1
. Else, when pe >
α−1
2α−1
, the payoff of
Drop is greater, which means that Forward is a dominated strategy and will never be chosen.
However, if the next hop node is not “merciful”, the payoff for Discard is zero. Thus as long
as α > 1, Forward is the dominant strategy.
From the discussion above, we can see that the validation forces the nodes to forward
packets in order to obtain the payoff. However, with a very unreliable channel, a node may
still be willing to drop because the lossy channel makes forwarding non-profitable. Thus, in
designing the incentives, we make the following claim.
Corollary 3.1. In SPPM, cooperation is enforced if α > 1−pe
1−2pe
.
3.1.2 Packet Trade Model
Node −i
Buy Discard
Node i
Buy αi − α¯i − α−i α−i − α¯−i − αi −α¯i − α−i α−i − α¯−i
Discard αi − α¯i −α¯−i − αi −α¯i −α¯−i
Table 3.1: Payoff matrix of two-player forwarding game under PTM.
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For the packet trade model, we reconstruct the “forwarding game” as a reciprocal two-
player game. Under this game model, any two neighboring nodes have bidirectional network
traffic demands [17], i.e., they rely on each other to forward packets. This assumption can be
regarded as an abstract scenario when a node is playing the same game versus all the other
nodes along the path. We model the two-player forwarding game as both nodes forward
packets to each other at the same time, and then, they simultaneously decide whether to buy
the packet or to discard it. We denote two neighboring nodes as i and −i. For node i, the
price (cost) it pays to buy the packet from its previous node is α¯i, and the price at which
it sells to node −i is αi. These prices are α¯−i and α−i when we consider the node −i. The
payoff matrix for the nodes is shown in Table 3.1.
In this game, since nodes will obtain benefit by selling packets, αx ≥ α¯x > 0; x = i,−i.
It is obvious that the strategy Buy is strictly dominated by Discard for both nodes. Hence,
if we assume that both nodes will only adopt pure strategies, the game has the same form as
the well-known Prisoner’s Dilemma game [38], although (Buy,Buy) is more desired. Thus
we have,
Lemma 3.3. In PTM, the strategies for attaining Nash Equilibrium is (Discard, Discard).
3.1.3 Hybrid Model
Neither PPM nor PTM provides enough insight for designing proper incentives for coopera-
tion. Thus, we consider a hybrid model which is a combination of PPM and PTM. We still
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consider the “forwarding game”. We continue to assume that the links are bidirectional, i.e.,
both nodes forward the packets to each other, and then a decision to forward or discard is
made. As shown in Figure 3.1, node NA relies on node NB to forward packet to NC , and
NB relies on NA to forward packet to ND. The cost of forwarding is 1, and nodes get α
as reward if their packet is forwarded by their counterpart. However, a reward cannot be
granted unless packets in both directions are forwarded, otherwise, the node which discards
gets no payoff and the other node consumes 1 for forwarding. The payoff matrix is shown in
Table 3.2.
NA NBND NC
Figure 3.1: Packet forwarding game.
Node −i
Forward Discard
Node i
Forward α− 1 α− 1 − 1 0
Discard 0 −1 0 0
Table 3.2: Payoff matrix of two player forwarding game.
It is shown in [52] that there is no such strategy profile in which forwarding is always
the dominant strategy. This also infers that the actions or strategies nodes take are hidden
from each other. It is even more obvious when we consider an unreliable channel. When
a node drops a packet, it is impossible for others to distinguish whether the dropping was
intentional or due to the unreliability of the channel. In this type of game, where the actions
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of the nodes are hidden from each other, nodes have enough reason (even if no incentive) to
play mixed strategies. Or rather, they are perceived to be playing mixed strategies simply
because the perception is not accurate through the unreliable channel.
Let us consider the equilibrium point when mixed strategies are allowed.
Lemma 3.4. The two-player forwarding game has a mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium when
both nodes play Forward with probability p = 1
α
.
Proof. We denote the probability of Forward for node i as pi, and the probability of Forward
for node −i as p−i. The expected payoff of node i is pip−i(α − 1) − pi(1 − p−i). The best
response for node i is Discard when p−i <
1
α
, and Forward, when p−i ≥
1
α
. For node −i, the
best response strategy is similar; Forward, when pi ≥
1
α
, and vice verse. The intersection of
the two best response strategies is the Nash Equilibrium, where both nodes play Forward
with probability pi = p−i =
1
α
.
Further, we consider the unreliable channel and re-solve the game. The variation the
channel brings in is that it is still possible that even node −i plays Forward, the credits are
lost due to transmission failure, so that it appears to be a Discard for node i and hence harm
the payoff of node i.
Lemma 3.5. Under unreliable channel, the two-player forwarding game has a mixed strategy
Nash Equilibrium when both nodes play Forward with probability p = 1
α(1−pe)
.
Proof. We use the same notations in Lemma 3.4. The expected payoff of node i is (1 −
pe)[pip−i(α − 1)(1 − pe) − pi(1 − p−i + p−ipe)]. The best response for node i is Discard
when p−i <
1
α(1−pe)
, and Forward, when p−i ≥
1
α(1−pe)
. The same reasoning is valid for
node −i. Thus the equilibrium reaches when both nodes play Forward with probability
p = 1
α(1−pe)
.
Let us further generalize the channel model. We consider a channel with M different
states, with channel loss probability pe(j) for the j
th state. We also define a M ×M channel
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transition probability matrix A, in which aj,k is the probability that channel goes from
state j to k. A special case of this model is the widely used two state (Good or Bad)
channel model, where channel transfers from one state to another with some probability.
The updated problem now can be stated as: Given a user’s current channel state j and
transition probability matrix A, how do we solve the game as defined in Table 3.2.
To solve this game, we bring the channel as the third player. Unlike node i or −i, the
channel does not care for a payoff, and the game can be solved with only payoffs of node i
or −i. If the channel condition goes from j to k, the payoff to node i is pip−i(α − 1)(1 −
pe(k))− pi(1− p−i + p−ipe(k)). However, this payoff depends only on probability of aj,k. To
consider all the channel transition probabilities, node i’s payoff with j as the current channel
state is
u(i) =
∑
k,k 6=j
aj,k(1− pe(k))
[
pip−i(α− 1)(1− pe(k))− pi(1− p−i + p−ipe(k))
]
. (3.1)
The best response for node i is to set pi as
pi =
1
α
∑
k,k 6=j aj,k(1− pe(k))
. (3.2)
If both nodes i and −i play the same mixed strategy with Forward probability in equation
(3.2), it forms a mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium.
Thus, we extend Lemma 3.5 for the generalized channel model as the following Lemma
with the discussion above serving as the proof.
Lemma 3.6. Under a generalized unreliable channel model with channel loss probability
pe(j) for the j
th state and probabilities aj,k for the state transitions, the two-player forwarding
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game has a mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium when both nodes play Forward with probability
p = 1
α
∑
k,k 6=j aj,k(1−pe(k))
.
Further, we have
Corollary 3.2. Under a generalized unreliable channel model, Nash Equilibrium is achieved
if incentive α is made equal to 1
p
∑
k,k 6=j aj,k(1−pe(k))
.
To summarize, we have the the following implications. i) The nodes’ strategies are
affected by the channel loss probability. We cannot ignore the wireless channel condition
when designing credit exchange systems. ii) When nodes’ actions are hidden, mixed strategy
can lead to a practical Nash Equilibrium. Due to the selfishness of the nodes, pure strategies
are mostly impractical. iii) The pricing model used by the nodes should be carefully evaluated
to incorporate factors like channel loss and best response strategies.
3.2 The Repeated Game
So far, we have discussed the strategies and payoffs in one-shot packet forwarding game
(i.e., stage game). In this section, we will analyze the strategies the nodes will adopt in a
repeated game, which is the repetitions of the same stage game. We define the repeated
packet forwarding game as:
Definition 3.1. The repeated packet forwarding game G is a two-player repeated game, with
a space of strategy profile S, and a vector u of von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions
defined over S. Thus, G = ({1, 2}, S,u) where S = ×2i=1p
(r)
i , and p
(r)
i is the probability
in stage r that player i plays Forward. u ≡< U1, U2 >, and Ui =
∑
r≥t δ
r−tui(r) is the
discounted payoff of player i from the tth stage.
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The non-negative parameter δ is called the discount factor and δ ∈ (0, 1). The discount
factor infers the preference of time or patience. A large δ shows a player’s patience in the
game and good valuation of payoffs she gets in future stages, while a small δ means that the
player is more eager for immediate payoffs and has higher probability of leaving the game
after each stage.
In the presence of unreliable channel, when a packet transmitted by node −i fails to
reach node i, node i cannot instantly distinguish whether node −i intentionally dropped the
packet or it was due to channel loss. However, statistically, node i could nonetheless gather
information and calculate an observed forwarding probability for node −i in the following
way.
Definition 3.2. The observed forwarding probability of player −i at stage r is
pˆ
(r)
−i = (1− pe(k))p
(r)
−i
assuming the channel is at state k.
Definition 3.3. The observed payoff of player i at stage r is
uˆ
(r)
i =
∑
k,k 6=j
aj,k[p
(r)
i pˆ
(r)
−i (α− 1)− p
(r)
i (1− pˆ
(r)
−i )]
=
∑
k,k 6=j
aj,k[(1− pe(k))αp
(r)
−i − 1]p
(r)
i .
Definition 3.4. The observed average discounted payoff of player i is
Uˆi = (1− δ)
∑
t≥0
δtuˆ
(t)
i .
The (1− δ) term is to unify the sum, so that the summation is 1 if there are infinite number
of stages.
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In the remaining part of this section, we present some of the well-known strategies (Last
Step Trigger [38], Naive Grim Trigger [38], Grim Trigger [38], and CORE [34, 35]) and
analyze their behaviors as well as limitations. In order not to introduce any confusion, we
denote p
(t)
i,S as the probability node i should take to forward packet at t
th stage according to
the strategy profile S.
3.2.1 Last Step Trigger
Definition 3.5. The strategy of Last Step Trigger (LST) is defined as
p
(0)
i,LST = 1
p
(r)
i,LST =
{
1 if pˆ
(r−1)
−i = 1
0 otherwise
From Definition 3.2, we know that it is not possible for pˆ
(r)
−i = 1 under channel with
pe(k) 6= 0. Thus, both nodes will play Discard from the second stage, no matter what they
played in the first stage. In other words, there is no non-trivial equilibrium point.
Thus, to show some tolerance towards channel loss, Last Step Trigger strategy sets a
threshold value (ρ) for observed forwarding probability.
Definition 3.6. The strategy of Last Step Trigger with channel loss tolerance is defined as
p
(0)
i,LST = 1
p
(r)
i,LST =
{
1 if pˆ
(r−1)
−i ≥ ρ
0 otherwise
where pˆ
(r)
−i is defined in Definition 3.2.
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Lemma 3.7. In repeated packet forwarding game, if both players use LST, the subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) is Forward if and only if pe(kr) ≤ 1 − ρ and forwarding
cost conforms to (3.4).
Proof. We denote pe(kr) as the channel loss probability for the r
th subgame, and the initial
state is k0. α(r,r+1) is the channel transition probability from rth subgame to the immediate
next stage. If pe(kr) ≤ 1− ρ in the first stage, p
(0)
i = 1 and pˆ
(0)
−i = 1− pe(k−1); the observed
payoff for node i is
uˆ
(0)
i = a(−1,0)(α− 1− αpe(k0)).
The observed average discounted payoff for node i is
Uˆi = (1− δ)
∑
r≥0
δra(r−1,r)(α− 1− αpe(kr)). (3.3)
The payoff is the same for node −i. If node i unilaterally deviates at the first stage by setting
p
(0)
i = 0, its observed payoff at this stage is 0. In the next stage, p
(1)
i = 1, pˆ
(1)
−i = 0, and
uˆ
(1)
i = −a(−1,0).
Using the same logic, the observed average discounted payoff for node i’s deviation is
Uˆi,dev = (1− δ)
∑
r≥0
δ2r+1(−a(2r+1,2r+2)).
Using one-shot deviation property (OSDP: see Definition 2.7), when Uˆi,dev ≤ Uˆi, node i has
no incentive to deviate. After some algebraic manipulations, this condition reduces to
α ≥
∑
r≥0[δ
ra(r−1,r) − δ
2r+1a(2r+1,2r+2)]∑
r≥0[δ
ra(r−1,r)(1− pe(kr))]
. (3.4)
If pe(kr) > 1− ρ, from second stage, both nodes will get zero payoffs. Thus, no equilibrium
point exists.
As a special case of Lemma 3.7, if the channel is static, with the same loss probability of
pe, then
Uˆi = (1− δ)
∑
r≥0
δr(α− 1− αpe) = α− 1− αpe.
Uˆi,dev = (1− δ)
∑
r≥0
δ2r+1(−1) =
−1
1 + δ
.
36
Under OSDP, the restriction on discount factor reduces to
α(1− pe)
αpe + 1− α
≤ δ ≤ 1. (3.5)
As a matter of fact, what Lemma 3.7 states is a pure strategy SPNE where both nodes
adheres to LST and forwards or discard with probability 1, i.e., p
(r)
i,LST = p
(r)
i . However, since
the channel is unreliable, as long as node i forward packet with probability p
(r)
i (p
(r)
i,LST = 6=
p
(r)
i ), such that pˆ
(r)
i ≥ ρ, node −i will cooperate in the next stage. Thus, mixed strategy
equilibrium analysis can be applied to LST, and when p
(r)
i ≥
ρ
1−pe(k)
, mixed strategy SPNE
can be achieved.
We follow the same procedure as the pure strategy analysis to find the mixed strategy
SPNE. When nodes i and −i play Forward with probabilities p
(r)
i and p
(r)
−i respectively, the
observed average discounted payoff for node i is
Uˆi = (1− δ)
∑
r≥0
δra(r−1,r)[(1− pe(kr))αp
(r)
−i − 1]p
(r)
i . (3.6)
The observed average discounted payoff for node i under deviation is
Uˆi,dev = −(1− δ)
∑
r≥0
δ2r+1a(2r+1,2r+2)p
(2r+2)
i . (3.7)
Therefore, according to OSDP, the condition to attain mixed strategy SPNE is
α ≥
∑
r≥0[δ
ra(r−1,r)p
(r)
i − δ
2r+1a(2r+1,2r+2)p
(2r+2)
i ]∑
r≥0[δ
ra(r−1,r)(1− pe(kr))]p
(r)
−ip
(r)
i
. (3.8)
For the special case of static lossy channel and p
(r)
i =
ρ
1−pe(k)
, the mixed strategy SPNE
condition reduces to
αρ
1− αρ
≤ δ ≤ 1. (3.9)
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Figure 3.2: Sensitivity of SPNE when LST is adopted.
Figure 3.2 shows the sensitivity of the mixed strategy SPNE obtained with LST. The
plots represent the range of δ for a given value of ρ or α. The plots also show the properties
of pure strategy SPNE, because when p
(r)
i = 1, ρ = 1− pe(k). It is suggested from the plots
that a large α value corresponds to a smaller ρ value, which means large incentives relax the
unreliability in the channel.
3.2.2 Naive Grim Trigger
Definition 3.7. Naive Grim Trigger (NGT) is defined as:
p
(0)
i,NGT = 1
p
(r)
i,NGT =
{
1 if pˆ
(r′)
−i ≥ ρ for all r
′ < r
0 otherwise
N-GRIM is an unforgiving strategy. A node is punished if it deviates. If both nodes play
Forward and pe(kr) ≤ 1−ρ, the observed average discounted payoff is given by equation (3.3).
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Let us consider that node i unilaterally deviates at the first stage by setting p
(0)
i = 0;
it gets zero payoff at the first stage. In the second stage, by observing node i’s dropping
behavior, node −i sets p
(1)
−i = 0, thus the payoff for node i is uˆ
(1)
i = a(−1,0)(−1). No further
payoffs will be gained in future subgames, because both nodes will punish each other for their
prior dropping behavior. Under OSDP, N-GRIM attains subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
if and only if (1− δ)
∑
r≥0 δ
ra(r−1,r)(α− 1− αpe(kr)) ≥ a(0,1) × (−1), which is equivalent to
α ≥
(1− δ)
∑
r≥0 δ
ra(r−1,r) − a(0,1)
(1− δ)
∑
r≥0 δ
ra(r−1,r)(1− pe(kr))
. (3.10)
The mixed strategy SPNE analysis for N-GRIM is similar to what we have done for LST.
Equilibrium can be attained when p
(r)
i ≥
ρ
1−pe(k)
, and the mixed strategy SPNE and its pure
strategy counterpart are equivalent when ρ = 1− pe(k).
N-GRIM only punishes the nodes if they deviate. Often times, a severe punishment is set
up to enforce cooperation between nodes. A Grim Trigger is such a strategy that punishes
a node for its own deviation, not just others.
3.2.3 Grim Trigger
Definition 3.8. Grim Trigger (GRIM) is defined as:
p
(0)
i,GRIM = 1
p
(r)
i,GRIM =
{
1 if pˆ
(r′)
−i , pˆ
(r′)
i ≥ ρ for all r
′ < r
0 otherwise
Using the same reasoning, if node i unilaterally deviates at the first stage, it does not
gain any payoff. Afterwards, according to GRIM, both nodes will play Discard. Therefore,
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Uˆi,dev = 0. Thus, the sufficient condition for subgame perfect Nash equilibrium under OSDP
is α− 1− αpe(kr) ≥ 0. Hence,
α ≥
1
1− ρ
. (3.11)
In the aforementioned analysis on three trigger strategies, we have shown that pure
strategy SPNE is attainable and it can enforce full cooperation. However, the conditions to
achieve pure strategy SPNE are associated with the channel loss. Furthermore, because of
the channel loss, mixed strategy SPNE is also feasible; nonetheless, mixed strategy SPNE
is not desirable because, it does not enforce full cooperation (i.e., p
(r)
i < 1). In other words,
with the trigger strategies, unless the channel loss rates are known, cooperation is hard to
achieve.
3.2.4 CORE
CORE is a complex strategy for cooperation enforcement proposed in [34, 35]. It is similar
to the well-know Tit-For-Tat (TFT) but different from TFT as it considers the last b stages
in the repeated game.
Definition 3.9. The CORE strategy can be defined as:
p
(0)
i,CORE = 1
p
(r)
i,CORE =
{
1 if B−i =
1
b
∑r−1
s=r−b[pˆ
(s)
−i ]
1
−1 ≥ 0
0 otherwise
where the sth stage observed history hs = (pˆ
(s)
i , pˆ
(s)
−i ), and
[x]1−1 =
{
1 if x ≥ 1
−1 if x < 1
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Theorem 3.1. CORE is subgame perfect if and only if
0 ≤ α ≤
1
1− pe
.
Proof. CORE is a b-stage history strategy because it takes into account what happened in
the last b stages. Without loss of generality, let us assume that any history hn results in
Bi = m, where m is uniformly distributed over [−b, b], and m is a discrete integer random
variable. For the sake of discussion, we assume B−i ≥ 0 and the channel has a loss probability
pe. We focus on node i from the first stage (starting stage). In the proof, we will calculate
the expected payoffs for node i considering different values m can take. A certain m value
leads to a specific payoff, and it comes with a probability as m changes. We first formalize
the expected payoff function, and then derive the probability terms in the function.
Case 1. If node i conforms to CORE, then its payoff at the first stage would be
uˆ
(0)
i = P(m = 0)[(1− pe)uˆ
forward
i + peuˆ
discard
i ]
+ P(m ≥ 1)uˆforwardi +P(m < 0)uˆ
discard
i , (3.12)
where P(·) means the probability and uˆforwardi , uˆ
discard
i are the observed payoffs of “Forward”
and “Discard”. From Definition 3.3, we know that
uˆforwardi = α(1− pe)− 1 (3.13)
uˆdiscardi = 0. (3.14)
Consider the next stage, node −i will update Bi with node i’s stage 0 behavior, and we
denote the updated Bi value as m
′. Similar to equation (3.12), the observed payoff at this
stage is
uˆ
(1)
i = P(m
′ = 0)[(1− pe)uˆ
forward
i + peuˆ
discard
i ]
+ P(m′ ≥ 1)uˆforwardi +P(m
′ < 0)uˆdiscardi .
With the process of m to m′ taken into consideration, we have the following equations.
P(m′ = 0) = peP(m = 0) + (1− pe)P(m = −1) (3.15)
P(m′ ≥ 1) = peP(m ≥ 2) + (1− pe)P(m ≥ 0) (3.16)
P(m′ < 0) = peP(m ≤ 0) + (1− pe)P(m ≤ 1) (3.17)
Since the distribution of m is already known, we can obtain the probabilities as
P(m = x) =
1
2b+ 1
(3.18)
P(m ≤ x) =
x+ b+ 1
2b+ 1
(3.19)
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where integer value x ∈ [−b, b].
Further, let us consider the lth stage. We denote lp as the random variable of positive
scores gained, i.e., the cooperation action is observed successfully by the opponent (Bi =
Bi + 1), ln as the random variable of negative scores gained, i.e., the cooperation action is
not observed by the opponent (Bi = Bi− 1). Since node i conforms to CORE, and forwards
at each stage, any gain in ln is due to the channel loss. Thus, lp and ln are binomially
distributed and
P(lp = LP ) = C
LP
l (1− pe)
LP pl−LPe (3.20)
P(ln = LN) = C
LN
l p
LN
e (1− pe)
l−LN . (3.21)
We denote a random variable y = Bi. From the analysis above, we know y = m+ lp− ln.
Similar to uˆ
(0)
i and uˆ
(1)
i , we can write uˆ
(l)
i as
uˆ
(l)
i = P(y = 0)[(1− pe)uˆ
forward
i + peuˆ
discard
i ]
+ P(y ≥ 1)uˆforwardi +P(y < 0)uˆ
discard
i . (3.22)
Hence, the problem relies on obtaining the probability distribution of y. Since y =
m + lp − (l − lp) = m + 2lp − l and l is a constant, to get the distribution of y, we first get
the distribution of w = y + l.
We use the probability generation function (pgf). For discrete random variable x, its pgf
is defined as
GX(z) = E[z
X ] =
∞∑
x=0
zxP(X = x) (3.23)
The pgf for w is
GW (z) = E[z
W ] = E[zM+2LP ] = E[zM ]E[z2LP ]
=
b∑
n=−b
zn
1
2b+ 1
[
l∑
n=0
znCnl (1− pe)
npl−ne ]
2
=
z−b − zb+1
(2b+ 1)(1− z)
[pe + (1− pe)z]
2l (3.24)
Let f (n)(x) = ∂
nf(x)
∂xn
,
P(w = k) =
G
(k)
W (0)
k!
(3.25)
For the probability terms in equation (3.12),
P(y = 0) = P(w = l) =
G
(l)
W (0)
l!
(3.26)
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P(y ≥ 1) = P(w ≥ l + 1) =
b+l∑
n=l+1
G
(n)
W (0)
n!
(3.27)
P(y < 0) = P(w < l) = 1−
G
(l)
W (0)
l!
−
b+l∑
n=l+1
G
(n)
W (0)
n!
(3.28)
Plugging equations (3.26), (3.27) and (3.28) back to equation (3.22), we can get the observed
payoff for node i at lth stage. Further, if node i conforms to CORE, its observed average
discounted payoff is given as Uˆi = (1− δ)
∑
t≥1 δ
t−1uˆt−1i . Algebraic manipulation reduces to
Uˆi = (1− δ)[α(1− pe)− 1]
{
1− pe + b
2b+ 1
+
∞∑
r=1
δr
[
(1− pe)
G
(r)
W (0)
r!
+
b+r∑
n=r+1
G
(n)
W (0)
n!
]}
(3.29)
Case 2. If node i does not conform to CORE, and it deviates in the first stage, the
payoff at the first stage is
uˆ
(0)
i,dev = P(m ≥ 1)uˆ
forward
i +P(m ≤ 0)uˆ
discard
i . (3.30)
Since the deviation lasts only for one stage, in the next stage, node i will again play CORE.
However, Bi is updated as = m − 1, which we denote as m
∗. It is not hard to obtain the
cumulative distribution function (cdf) of m∗ as
P(m∗ ≤ x) =


0 if x < −b− 1
x+b+2
2b+1
if − b− 1 ≤ x ≤ b− 1
1 if x > b− 1
(3.31)
Using the same notations defined in Case 1, we let y∗ = m∗ + lp − ln and W
∗ = y∗ + l.
The pgf for W ∗ is
GW ∗(z) =
b−1∑
n=−b−1
zn
1
2b+ 1
[
l∑
n=0
znCnl (1− pe)
npl−ne ]
2
=
z−b−1 − zb
(2b+ 1)(1− z)
[pe + (1− pe)z]
2l (3.32)
Similarly, the observed average discounted payoff for node i given it deviation on the first
stage is presented in equation (3.33).
Uˆi,dev = (1−δ)[α(1−pe)−1]
{
2b
2b+ 1
+
∞∑
r=0
δr+1
[
(1− pe)
G
(r)
W ∗(0)
r!
+
b+r∑
n=r+1
G
(n)
W ∗(0)
n!
]}
(3.33)
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Under OSDP, CORE is subgame perfect if deviation is not profitable, or Uˆi,dev ≤ Uˆi. We
denote A = (1− pe)
G
(r)
W (0)
r!
+
∑b+r
n=r+1
G
(n)
W (0)
n!
, and B = (1− pe)
G
(r)
W∗
(0)
r!
+
∑b+r
n=r+1
G
(n)
W∗
(0)
n!
. Thus,
Uˆi,dev − Uˆi = (1− δ)[α(1− pe)− 1][
b+ pe − 1
2b+ 1
+ B|r=0 +
∞∑
r=1
δr(δB − A)] (3.34)
Since terms A and B are probabilities, 0 ≤ A ≤ 1, 0 ≤ B ≤ 1, equation (3.34) can be further
reduced as
Uˆi,dev − Uˆi ≤ (1− δ)[α(1− pe)− 1][
b+ pe − 1
2b+ 1
+ B|r=0 − δB|r=1]
≤ (1− δ)[α(1− pe)− 1]
b+ pe − 1
2b+ 1
(3.35)
Since b ≥ 1,
0 ≤ α ≤
1
1− pe
. (3.36)
Corollary 3.3. When both nodes adopt CORE, the equilibrium point is p
(r)
i = p
(r)
−i = 1,
∀ r ≥ 0. Cooperation is hence achieved.
Remark 1 : The theorem suggests that CORE does not enforce cooperation by rewards,
but punishment. An incentive based strategy bears the basic constraint that α > 1, so that
the forwarding is profitable. In CORE, even if the channel is reliable, α ≤ 1. This property
can be further generalized to any strategy where decision is based on past action profiles,
especially, when a series of past actions are considered.
Remark 2 : CORE can be regarded as a “reputation based” strategy. Nodes gain
reputation when forwarding is observed and loose reputation when discarding is observed.
Although noise exists (channel is not reliable), CORE can still lead to subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium, and hence, full cooperation. Simulation results presented in Section 6.1 also
show the effectiveness of CORE under “imperfect monitoring”.
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3.3 Collusion Resistance and Coalition Formation
In this section, we consider how cooperation is enforced. In particular, we address two
aspects: i) how to resist collusion among nodes that deviate from the cooperation strategy,
and ii) how the population of cooperative nodes grows and cooperation prevails? It is noted
that we still focus our analysis on the forwarding game (i.e., single hop forwarding). A good
literature of incentive-compatible and strategyproof collusion resistance routing can be found
in [26, 45, 46, 53].
3.3.1 Collusion Resistance
Definition 3.10. Collusion is a group of players working together to maximize their own
payoffs regardless of the social optimum. A strategy sc is a colluding strategy if and only if
Uˆi(s
c, sc) ≥ Uˆi(s
a, sc),
where sa is any strategy other than sc. It is called a strict colluding strategy if the
inequality holds.
We consider a pure strategy profile s∗ which is subgame perfect and enforce cooperation
on the equilibrium point (e.g., CORE). The anti-collusion game is a game that played among
players adopting colluding strategy sc and cooperative strategy s∗. The aim of the anti-
collusion game is to suppress collusion and achieve cooperation. In the rest of this chapter,
we are interested in find the conditions that ensure the outcome of the anti-collusion game
is full cooperation.
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Let xc be the population share of a strict colluding pure strategy profile s
c. The following
lemma gives an upper bound on xc.
Lemma 3.8. A cooperation enforcement strategy s∗ is collusion resistant if and only if
xc <
Uˆi(s
∗, s∗)− Uˆi(s
c, s∗)
Uˆi(sc, sc) + Uˆi(s∗, s∗)− Uˆi(sc, s∗)− Uˆi(s∗, sc)
. (3.37)
Proof. We assume the number of nodes in the game is n. For the group of cooperating nodes,
the group’s total payoff is
Uˆ∗ = n(1− xc)Uˆi(s
∗, s∗) + nxcUˆi(s
∗, sc). (3.38)
The total payoff for the group of colluding nodes is
Uˆ c = n(1− xc)Uˆi(s
c, s∗) + nxcUˆi(s
c, sc). (3.39)
Collusion resistance requires that Uˆ∗ > Uˆ c. Therefore,
xc[Uˆi(s
∗, sc)− Uˆi(s
∗, s∗) + Uˆi(s
c, s∗)− Uˆi(s
c, sc)] > Uˆi(s
c, s∗)− Uˆi(s
∗, s∗).
Since subgame perfect Nash equilibrium requires Uˆi(s
∗, s∗) ≥ Uˆi(s
c, s∗) and strict colluding
infers Uˆi(s
c, sc) > Uˆi(s
∗, sc), we get equation (3.37).
3.3.2 Coalition Formation
Lemma 3.8 shows that in order to resist collusion, the colluding node population should be
kept under a threshold. However, when the games are played over time, the population of
different groups (i.e., cooperative or colluding) is highly dynamic. We apply evolutionary
game theory [48] in our following analysis to capture the dynamics on population.
Definition 3.11. Let ∆ be a strategy set, when strategies sx, sy ∈ ∆. sx is an evolution-
arily stable strategy (ESS) if for every strategy sy 6= sx there exists some ǫ¯y ∈ (0, 1) such
that
u[sx, ǫsy + (1− ǫ)sy] > u[sy, ǫsy + (1− ǫ)sx]
for all ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ¯y).
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Proposition 3.1. ∆ESS = {sx ∈ ∆
NE : u(sx, sy) > u(sy, sy), ∀ sy ∈ β(sx), sy 6= sx}, where
∆NE denotes the set of Nash Equilibrium strategies, and β(sx) is the set of best response
strategies against sx.
We consider the same s∗ and assume it is ESS. We denote x∗ as the population share of
nodes adopting s∗, i.e., group of cooperative nodes. It is clear x∗ + xc = 1.
According to evolution theory, the dynamics for the population of x∗ is
x˙∗ = [u(s
∗, sc)− u(sc, sc)]x∗ (3.40)
Let Ma represent the payoff matrix when s
∗ plays sc.
Ma =

 u(s
∗, s∗) u(s∗, sc)
u(sc, s∗) u(sc, sc)


This matrix also holds true for the player plays sc. Applying Ma to equation (3.40), we get
x˙∗ = [(u(s
∗, s∗)− u(sc, s∗))x∗xc]x∗ + [(u(s
∗, sc)− u(sc, sc))x∗xc]xc
= (a1x∗ − a2xc)x∗xc (3.41)
where a1 = u(s
∗, s∗)− u(sc, s∗), a2 = u(s
c, sc)− u(s∗, sc).
Lemma 3.9. The cooperation enforcement strategy s∗ leads to +1 evolutionarily stable state
on population share if and only if s∗ is ESS or the initial population share x0c < a1/(a1+a2).
Proof. For any x∗ < 1, the +1 state can only be reached if x˙∗ > 0. Since xc, x∗ > 0, it
requires a1x∗ − a2xc > 0. If a1a2 < 0. The only possibility is a1 > 0, a2 < 0, and indicates
s∗ is ESS (Proposition 3.1). If a1a2 > 0. x
0
c <
a1
a1+a2
.
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It can be noted that in case s∗ is not ESS, x0c =
a1
a1+a2
, or x0∗ =
a2
a1+a2
are the mixed
strategy Nash Equilibrium values. It suggests that when no ESS exists, the strategy with
the initial population greater than the equilibrium value prevails.
Summarizing the discussions above, we have the following theorem on a general cooper-
ation enforcement strategy.
Theorem 3.2. A cooperation enforcement strategy s∗ enforces the prevalence of cooperation
if and only if it satisfies either of the following two conditions:
• s∗ is ESS,
• x0c < min(
Uˆi(s
∗,s∗)−Uˆi(s
c,s∗)
Uˆi(sc,sc)+Uˆi(s∗,s∗)−Uˆi(sc,s∗)−Uˆi(s∗,sc)
, a1
a1+a2
).
Remarks: In the second condition, both terms in the minimization function are the
same if δ = 1 for the repeated game. It also suggests that when all the players in the game
stick to continuous participation, the colluding nodes will be enforced to be cooperative with
time. Thus collusion resistant is bona fide cooperation coalition formation. The sensitivity
of the convergence of the formation (i.e., x˙∗) will be determined by the payoff matrix entries.
3.4 Summary
In this chapter, we address the issue of cooperation enforcement in wireless network under
homogeneous unreliable channel. We present a game theoretic approach to analyze how
the cooperation can be achieved through Nash equilibrium in the packet forwarding game.
We model the unreliable channel as a transition probability matrix and solve the game
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for a credit exchange system. We show that in order to sustain equilibrium strategy, an
associated forwarding price should be charged. The repeated game analysis is incorporated
to solve the stage game that is played again and again. We derive the necessary and sufficient
conditions where the forwarding game can reach subgame perfect Nash equilibrium under
different strategies. The results show the forwarding cost should be priced with reference
to the channel loss rate and discount factor. Four reputation based and history dependent
strategies are formally analyzed, and by rigorous proof, we demonstrate such reputation
based strategy can enforce cooperation under unreliable channel. Last but not least, we
use evolutionary game theory to study how the cooperative population grows and resists
collusion. We show that cooperation can be achieved by adopting an evolutionarily stable
strategy or restricting the initial population of non-cooperative nodes.
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CHAPTER 4
COOPERATION ENFORCEMENT WITH
HETEROGENEOUS UNRELIABLE CHANNEL
When we extend our discussions in last chapter to include the case of multi-hop data com-
munication in wireless networks, an important challenge in such scenario is that different
nodes will experience heterogeneous channel conditions. In this chapter, we provide a game
theoretic solution to enforce cooperation in a multi-hop wireless network in the presence of
heterogeneous channel noise. We focus on the packet forwarding process and model it as a
hidden action game with imperfect private monitoring in Section 4.1. In Section 4.2, we pro-
pose a state machine based strategy to reach Nash Equilibrium. The equilibrium is proved
to be a Sequential Equilibrium with carefully designed system parameters. Furthermore, in
Section 4.3 we extend our discussion to a general multi-hop wireless network scenario by
refining the strategy profiles to handle multi-hop packet forwarding.
4.1 The Packet Forwarding Game under Heterogeneous Noise
We begin our analysis with a review of the classical two-player packet forwarding problem
[14, 17]. As shown in Figure 4.1, we consider two data sessions: (i) AS to AD through BS
and (ii) BS to BD through AS. If the channel is perfect (loss free), based on the actions
50
AS and BS take, they will obtain different payoffs as listed in Table 4.1. The entries in the
matrix, i.e., R, S, T, P, not only determine the payoffs players can obtain, but also indicate
the type of the games. For example, in the well-known Prisoner’s Dilemma [38], which also
characterizes the scenario of packet forwarding, T > R > P > S. It is noted that, depending
on how the packet system is configured, the values in the matrix might be different. In
this research, instead of using a specific payoff matrix like [17], we assume the matrix has a
general format as shown in Table 4.1, and later, we will show how the values in the matrix
affect the equilibrium properties of our strategy. With the payoff matrix, it is clear that
for an action a = (aAS , aBS) = (Forward,Discard), the payoff vector would definitely be
u = (uAS , uBS) = (S, T ).
?
SBSA DADB
T or P
S or P
Action: Forward
Observed Payoff:
Observed Payoff:
Action: Discard
X
Figure 4.1: Two player packet forwarding game model.
However, when we bring in the channel loss, even if both nodes take the same actions
as above, the payoff vector is not likely to remain the same. For node AS, it forwards BS’s
packet to BD, but the forwarding action might fail due to the channel noise, and BD does
51
Node AS
Forward Discard
Node BS
Forward R R S T
Discard T S P P
Table 4.1: Payoff matrix of two player packet forwarding game. R=Reward, S=Sucker,
T=Temptation, P=Penalty.
not receive the packet. Since BS’s payoff is determined by whether BD receives the packet,
from node BS’s perspective, AS is playing Discard even though its action was Forward.
Thus, the payoff vector now is u = (P, P ). Nonetheless, node BS cannot directly observe
AS’s action. This is because what BS can observe relies only on the channel between it and
AS and this channel is different from that between AS and BD due to interference. Also,
we do not assume that BD can, through some mechanism, inform BS about whether the
packet is received or not. Hence, what the nodes can do is to monitor their own payoffs
(realized payoff ), and indirectly, form a belief on what others have done. Based on the
same payoff matrix in Table 4.1, if the noise is presented as a channel loss probability pe,
we can calculate the probabilities associated with actions and payoffs. In Table 4.2 , we
list the probabilities as node i plays the first action and its opponent plays the second
action in the action profiles. With these probabilities, we can further calculate the expected
payoff of a node. For example, when a = (Forward,Discard), the expected payoff vector is
u = ((1− pe)S + peP, (1− pe)T + peP ).
Let us now formally define the packet forwarding game under noise.
Definition 4.1. A packet forwarding game (Γ) under noise is a quadruple (I, A,Ω, u), where
• I = 1, 2, ..., n denotes the set of nodes.
• A is a space of actions (ai) a node (i) can take.
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Node i’s payoffs
R S T P
Actions
(F, F) (1− pe)
2 pe(1− pe) pe(1− pe) p
2
e
(D, F) 0 0 1− pe pe
(F, D) 0 1− pe 0 pe
(D, D) 0 0 0 1
Table 4.2: Payoff probabilities for given action profiles.F=Forward, D=Discard.
• Ω is a space of observed signals. For every action ai ∈ Ai node i takes, it observes
a signal ωi ∈ Ωi. Both action ai and signal ωi are node i’s private information. The
probability distribution of private signal ω = (ω1, ..., ωn) depends on the action profile
a = (a1, ..., an) and the noise in the channel. It is denoted as p(ω|a).
• u presents the realized payoffs. For node i, its expected payoff is given by gi(a) =
Σωp(ω|a)ui(ai, ωi).
Often times, this game is played repeatedly as nodes have a number of packets to be
forwarded. From a discounted repeated game [38] perspective, the discounted payoff for
node i is Ui = Σ
∞
t=0δ
tgi(a(t)), where a(t) is the action taken at time t and δ ∈ (0, 1) is the
discount factor. The discount factor infers the preference of time or patience. A large δ
shows a node’s patience in the game and good valuation of payoffs it gets in future stages,
while a small δ means that the node is more eager for immediate payoffs and has higher
probability of leaving the game after each stage.
The above definition differs from most existing game models in the sense that a node
cannot directly observe others’ actions, rather, it observes through a private signal1 associ-
ated with the action profiles played. As a matter fact, existing models can be regarded as
a special case when ω = a for all nodes (all nodes have perfect public observation of others’
1It is noted that the signal here does not necessarily mean the physical signal in the communication
channel, but rather, it refers to all the possible observations a node can make, e.g., the payoffs.
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actions), or ω1 = ω2 = ... = ωn 6= a (all nodes have imperfect public observation of others’
actions). While the existing models either ignore the noisy nature of the wireless channel
or need some sort of communications among nodes to exchange the observations, our model
eliminates such pre-assumptions and hence most appropriately abstracts an wireless network
scenario.
The outcome of a single stage (static) game can be characterized by the well-known
Nash Equilibrium [38]. In a Nash equilibrium, no player can unilaterally deviate from the
equilibrium strategy to gain more payoff; or in other words, every player is playing the best
response to others. When the same game is played repeatedly for finite or infinite number of
times, the notion of subgame is used so that the game can be viewed as a subset of the original
game starting at a certain stage, with a perfectly or imperfectly monitored history. The
repeated game can be analyzed by finding the Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE),
which consists of a series of Nash Equilibria at every subgame of the original game [38]. From
our modeling of the packet forwarding game, in order for each node to make best response
to others’ actions that are hidden, it first needs to form a belief on what the others have
done. A profile of strategies and beliefs makes an assessment. To further refine the SPNE
given the assessment, Sequential Equilibrium [24] is introduced.
Definition 4.2. Sequential Equilibrium2 is an assessment of strategy π and belief µ, which
satisfies the following properties:
• Strategy Sensibility: When the beliefs are fixed, no player prefers at any point to change
her part of strategy in π given the information set, i.e., π maximizes the expected
payoffs.
2Please refer to [24] for a more formal definition.
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• Belief Sensibility: Those information sets can be reached with positive probabilities (µ)
given π.
• Consistency: The assessment should be a limit point of a sequence of the mixed strate-
gies and associated sensible beliefs, i.e., (π, µ) = limn→∞(πn, µn).
Thus, in order to enforce cooperation in wireless networks with noisy channel, it is highly
desirable that any adopted strategies and their associated beliefs constitute the sequential
equilibrium. Also, this sequential equilibrium is attainable by carefully designing the pa-
rameters to calculate the beliefs. To further clarify the concept of sequential equilibrium
in the packet forwarding game, we assume that although nodes cannot perfectly observe
the actions of others, they have beliefs about what the opponents have done. Based on the
beliefs, they take corresponding actions in future games. The sequential equilibrium requires
that the nodes form their beliefs in such a way (e.g., following Bayesian rules) that the states
associated with the beliefs can be reached with positive probabilities. In addition, the con-
sequent actions taken given the beliefs are the best response to the current state. A possible
solution to attain the equilibrium is proposed in [18], where one node plays the Grim Trigger
strategy and the other one plays the defection strategy, and the beliefs are updated at every
stage of the game. However, the belief-based approach requires extensive computations, and
moreover, their modeling on the effect of the channel is not thoroughly investigated, as the
Discard action can never be observed as Forward. In this dissertation, our goal is to design
a more efficient way to attain sequential equilibrium under the noisy channel. Our approach
is different from [18] in both design notion and methodology.
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4.2 State Machine Based Forwarding Approach
In this section, we demonstrate how to construct a sequential equilibrium using state machine
based forwarding approach. It is noted that a larger space of other cooperation enforcement
strategies, as well as the associated equilibria with noisy channels have been analyzed in
[37, 47]. For the sake of clarity, we consider the packet forwarding game between two nodes.
First, we define two types of observable signals ω. Punishment signal and Reward signal.
We define that a Punishment signal is observed when the node’s realized payoff is P , other-
wise a Reward signal is observed. It is noted that a punishment signal can be observed even
if node is playing cooperatively. Table 4.2 can be used to calculate p(ω|a) given the action
profiles. However, the observations are private.
Further, let us consider a strategy with two states, C (Cooperative) and N (Non-
Cooperative). The strategy begins with state C and operates with the following transition
probabilities.
• When the node is in State C, play Discard with a small probability qC . If Discard
is taken and Punishment is observed, transit to N with probability ρC . Stay in C,
otherwise.
• When the node is in State N , play Discard with a large probability qN . If Discard is
taken and Reward is observed, transit to C with probability ρN . Stay in N , otherwise.
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The state machine based forwarding approach is illustrated in Figure 4.2. It is noted that
in this approach, there is always uncertainty on which state the opponent node is, and hence
the beliefs are updated all the time. In order for this design to reach sequential equilibria, it
is important that, with any history, the state machine is a best response to itself, regardless
of the beliefs. In other words, the problem is to find whether there is a set of the system
parameters (transition probabilities), such that node i does not gain different payoffs by
choosing either actions, i.e., Forward (F ) or Discard (D), no matter what state its opponent
node −i is in.
C N
ρ
ρ
C N
|
|
q
Non−Cooperative
q
Cooperative
p(Punishment  D)
p(Reward  D)
ρ ρ
C
N
N
C
1 − 1 − 
choose D
with
with
choose D
Figure 4.2: Forwarding state machine.
The design problem is hence reduced to finding the system parameters (qC , qN , ρC , ρN)
to make the strategy itself a best response to the state machine. We denote VC and VN as
the average repeated game payoffs for node i when node −i is in state C and N respectively.
From Bellman equations [6], we can write the following equations.
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When node i plays F ,
VC = (1− δ)[(1− qC)R + qCS] + δ[(1− qCpeρC)VC + qCpeρCVN ] (4.1)
VN = (1− δ)[(1− qN)R + qNS] + δ{(1− pe)ρNqNVC + [1− (1− pe)ρNqN ]VN} (4.2)
Similarly, if node i plays D,
VC = (1− δ)[(1− qC)T + qCP ] + δ[(1− qCρC)VC + qCρCVN ] (4.3)
VN = (1− δ)[(1− qN)T + qNP ] + δVN (4.4)
For node i to be indifferent between F or D, Equations (4.1) and (4.3) should be equal
when node −i is in state C, or Equations (4.2) and (4.4) should be equal when node −i
is in state N . Thus, the solutions for above equations represent the equilibria of the state
machine. The following theorem provides one of the solutions.
Theorem 4.1. For the state machine based forwarding approach, there is a sequential equi-
librium for large δ, when pe <
R−P
T−P
and T > R.
Proof. From Equations (4.1) and (4.3) we have
(1− δ)[(1− qC)(T −R) + pC(P − S)] = δqCρC(1− pe)(VC − VN) (4.5)
Thus, from Equation (4.1), we can further derive
VC = (1− qC)R + qCS +
pe
1− pe
[(1− qC)(R− T ) + qC(S − P )] (4.6)
Similarly, from Equations (4.2) and (4.4) we have
(1− δ)[(1− qN)(T −R) + pN(P − S)] = δqNρN(1− pe)(VC − VN) (4.7)
and VN = (1− qN)T + qNP (4.8)
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From the observation of Equations (4.5)-(4.8), we are left with four variables and two
equations, which implies there are two free variables. To find a possible solution to the
equations, to begin with, we consider ρC as a free variable and set ρC = 1. The reasoning
is as follows. If there is a solution of the above equations with ρC < 1, we can always
decrease qC in Equation (4.6) to increase VC . However, this will lead us to further increase
ρC to balance Equation (4.5). Thus, ρC can be increased to 1 but never exceed 1 as it is
a probability. The same reasoning can be applied to the other free variable qN and we let
qN = 1. For qN < 1, increasing qN can lead to a decrease in ρN in Equation (4.8) to balance
the decreased VN from Equation (4.7).
The above analysis reduces to
VN = P (4.9)
and
ρN =
qC(P − S)
(1− qC)(T −R) + qC(P − S)
. (4.10)
It is not hard to see that ρN ∈ [0, 1].
Putting Equations (4.10) and (4.6) back to Equation (4.7), we obtain a quadratic equation
of qC as
{δ(1− pe)[R− S −
pe
1− pe
(T −R + S − P )]}q2C
+{δ(1− pe)[P −R−
pe
1− pe
(T −R)] + (1− δ)
(P − S − T +R)}qC + (1− δ)(T −R) = 0 (4.11)
One root of Equation (4.11) is easy to get as qC = 0 when δ = 1. To find the relationship
between qC and δ, we check the existence of implicit function (F ) around (qC , δ)=(0, 1) as
∂F
∂qC
|(qC ,δ)=(0,1) = (1− pe)[P −R−
pe
1− pe
(T −R)]. (4.12)
Since pe <
R−P
T−P
, Equation (4.12) 6= 0, and thus the Implicit Function Theorem can be applied
around δ = 1 such that
dqC
dδ
= −
∂F
∂δ
|(qC ,δ)=(0,1)
∂F
∂qC
|(qC ,δ)=(0,1)
=
T −R
(1− pe)[P −R−
pe
1−pe
(T −R)]
. (4.13)
From the assumptions, we know that Equation (4.13)< 0, which essentially states that
there exists a value qC ∈ (0, 1), for a large enough δ such that qC → 0 as δ → 1. Hence, a
set of parameters satisfying the system requirement is obtained around δ = 1.
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Further, with the set of parameters, the average payoff is updated as
VC = lim
qC→0
{(1− qC)R + qCS +
pe
1− pe
[(1− qC)(R− T ) + qC(S − P )]}
= R +
pe
1− pe
(R− T ) > P. (4.14)
Thus, state C is always more efficient than stateN . In addition, when the nodes are updating
their beliefs on the opponent, it will always assume that the opponent has never deviated
because no deviation is observable. The consistency requirement is satisfied as neither node
tries to update its beliefs about others; instead, the nodes play the best response strategies.
Hence, we have proved that the state machine based forwarding approach has a sequential
equilibrium for large δ, when pe <
R−P
T−P
and T > R.
In the proof, we showed that with the system parameters (state transition probabilities)
in [0,1], qC can be arbitrarily close to 0 as δ goes to 1; and the cooperative state is always
strictly Pareto superior to the non-cooperative state. Moreover, the average payoff of the
cooperative state is arbitrarily close to R− pe
1−pe
(T −R).
By further manipulating the constraints in Theorem 4.1, we have the properties as follows.
Corollary 4.1. In order to reach sequential equilibrium, R < T < 1−pe
pe
(R− P ).
Corollary 4.2. In a sequential equilibrium, the average payoff of the cooperative state is
lower bounded by P and upper bounded by R− pe
1−pe
(T −R).
Corollaries 4.1 and 4.2 infer that the values of the elements in the payoff matrix can help
to reach the sequential equilibrium, and at the same time pushing the average payoff to the
Pareto frontiers. In particular, we can find a small enough ǫ such that T = R + ǫ to relax
the constraint on channel loss in Theorem 4.1.
Corollary 4.3. If T = R+ǫ, when ǫ→ 0+, a sequential equilibrium can be reached regardless
of the noise in the channel, and the average payoff of the cooperative state VC → R.
Proof. Since T = R+ǫ, in Theorem 4.1, in order to reach sequential equilibrium pe <
R−P
T−P
=
T−ǫ−P
T−P
. Also, limǫ→0+
T−ǫ−P
T−P
= 1. Since pe ∈ (0, 1), for ǫ → 0
+, it essentially relaxes the
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constraint on pe; thus pe can take any value in (0,1). From Corollary 4.1, T <
1−pe
pe
(R− P ),
which derives pe
1−pe
< R−P
R+ǫ
. Hence, VC(ǫ) = limǫ→0+ R−
ǫ(R−P )
R+ǫ
= R.
4.3 Multi-hop Packet Forwarding
So far, we have discussed the two-player case of packet forwarding when the observation is
imperfect and private. However, in a wireless network, packet forwarding from source to
destination usually requires multiple hops. In this section, we model the multi-hop packet
forwarding as a multi-player packet forwarding game. We investigate the interactions among
the players and analyze the cooperation strategies based on two-player approaches discussed
in Section 4.2.
Before we study the cooperation strategies in this scenario, we need to characterize a
multi-hop wireless network and model the packet forwarding game, in which multiple nodes
participate in a hop-by-hop manner. We consider a network where nodes are mobile within
a certain area. The nodes are selfish but not malicious. Each of nodes can be a source of
a data session which generates packets and sends them to a specific destination. Thus, the
multi-player packet forwarding game can be modeled from the packet forwarding game under
heterogeneous noise.
Definition 4.3. The multi-player packet forwarding game is a series of packet forwarding
games (as defined in Definition 4.1) Γ = (I, A,Ω, u) under noise where for each data session:
• I = 1, 2, ..., n denotes a set of nodes that are candidates to form a packet forwarding
route from source to destination.
• A = (Forward,Drop).
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• Ω is the space of the observed signals and it is private to the node itself. No private
observation exchange is assumed. A node only plays with its immediate neighbors in
I, and cannot obtain any information beyond one hop.
• The payoffs are defined in Table 4.1 for per unit packet forwarded. A data session
consists of multiple unit packets and thus the forwarding game is repeated.
4.3.1 Multi-hop Packet Forwarding Strategy Design
Theorem 4.1 and Corollary 4.3 state that it is possible for the two-player forwarding game
to reach a Sequential Equilibrium where cooperation can be enforced. Since a node can only
interact with its one hop neighbor, for a route from source node to the destination, it is
natural that if the games played at each of the hops reach Sequential Equilibria according to
our model, all the nodes are cooperative in the multi-hop forwarding. For each data session,
based on whether there is a dedicated route, the multi-hop packet forwarding strategy can
be categorized into two types: routing based forwarding and hop-by-hop forwarding.
4.3.1.1 Routing Based Forwarding
In this type of forwarding strategy, a route has to be established before packet forwarding
starts. Thus, a route discovery process is involved and the source node knows explicitly the
intermediate nodes at the time of route establishment. As the route discovery process can
be done in various ways, like Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector Routing (AODV) [40]
and Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) [19] protocols, a route selection mechanism should be
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in place to determine which nodes are chosen to form the route, or in other words, who the
players are in the game. The criteria in route selection are diversified. Usually, the aim of
the routing protocol and the type of application determine the route selection, e.g., route
with least hops, route with least traffic, and etc. With the route established, the packet
forwarding games can then be played along the route. For any node possessing a packet,
it plays the game with the next hop node on the route following the approaches defined
in Figure 4.2 with C as the initial state. If for some reason, the next hop node does not
participate in the game any more, the route is broken and a new route needs to be set up and
the games will be played with a new set of players. The routing based forwarding strategy
can be listed as the following steps:
• Step 1: Routing discovery and selection.
• Step 2: Play two-player packet forwarding game at every hop along the route for each
of the data packet to be delivered.
• Step 3: Re-establish a new route if the original route is down and repeat the process
from Step 1.
4.3.1.2 Hop-by-Hop Forwarding
In the situation of high mobility, route changes are fast and it is costly to maintain a
dedicated route from source to destination. Thus, it is possible that any node possessing
the packet determines the next hop relay node as long as the packet can eventually reach
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the destination node. A typical hop-by-hop forwarding is the Greedy Perimeter Stateless
Routing (GPSR) [22] in which every hop is geographically closer to the destination. While
the frequency of updating the next hop differs from one application to another, a node can
possibly have several next hop relaying nodes during the same data session. From the game
theory perspective, a node might choose to play the same forwarding game with different
nodes at different times. The hop-by-hop forwarding strategy simply follows two steps.
• Step 1: Choose or update the selection of next hop relay node.
• Step 2: If a node possesses the packet, play the two-player packet forwarding game for
each of the data packet to be delivered.
The advantage of routing based forwarding over hop-by-hop forwarding is that the source
nodes have some control on the players in the games. This might be important because the
source node can specify which nodes it wants to include in the multi-player packet forwarding
game. However, the extra overhead on route discovery and maintenance put routing based
forwarding on a less favorable side compared with the lightweight hop-by-hop forwarding.
As indicated in Section 4.2, the difficult of the forwarding game lies in the incapability
of identifying the state the opponent node is in, and it is also true for multi-hop packet
forwarding games. However, since all nodes are selfish and only interested in maximizing
their own payoffs, individual games can be devised so that cooperation strategy means
optimal payoffs for all the nodes in the games. We simplify the multi-hop packet forwarding
game by decomposing it to multiple two-player packet forwarding games between a node
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and its next hop relay node. The following theorem shows how cooperation is enforced in
multi-hop packet forwarding.
Theorem 4.2. Multi-hop packet forwarding strategies (defined above) lead to a Sequential
Equilibrium for the multi-player packet forwarding game.
Proof. First, we consider the hop-by-hop forwarding strategy. For each sender node j and
its next hop relay node k, the game played between them can reach Sequential Equilibrium
as suggested in Theorem 4.1. If node j changes its criteria in selecting the next hop, and
choose another node, the new node pair will still play the two-player packet forwarding
game and hence guarantees a Sequential Equilibrium, as long as δ is close to 1 and the
system parameters are set accordingly. Further, when we consider any two consecutive hops,
the games played at every hop generate independent equilibria of each other. Thus, when
Sequential Equilibrium is achieved at every hop, the hop-by-hop forwarding strategy leads
to Sequential Equilibrium for the whole multi-player packet forwarding game.
In the scenario of routing based forwarding strategy, when a route is selected, the players
and games to be played at each hop are fixed. Since Sequential Equilibria are attainable
at each hop, a route level Sequential Equilibrium on multi-player packet forwarding game
is induced. In the case of route selection, if no payoff metrics are involved in the selection
decision, reaching the equilibrium solely depends on the games played at each hop. However,
if the route with maximum payoff is selected (e.g., VCG [3] and its variant protocols), the
sender node has no incentive to switch to another route because any deviation will incur
a lower payoff. In this case, the Sequential Equilibrium can be achieved on the route with
maximized payoff.
Moreover, when we apply Theorem 4.1 to each of the hops of two-player forwarding game,
consistency is maintained and hence the same for the multi-player packet forwarding game.
Therefore, multi-hop packet forwarding strategies lead to a Sequential Equilibrium for the
multi-player packet forwarding game.
Furthermore, the corollaries for Theorem 4.1 can be extended for multi-player packet
forwarding game. For example, if we assume a forwarding process of m hops with pe(m) as
the associated channel loss probabilities, the payoff boundaries for the forwarding with all
cooperative node are [mP, mR−Σm
pe(m)
1−pe(m)
(T −R)], which is also strictly bounded by mR.
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4.4 Summary
In this chapter, we investigate strategies that attain cooperation in wireless networks with
heterogeneous noisy channel. We consider packet forwarding in unreliable channel as the
core problem and abstract it into a game theoretic model. The heterogeneous and unreliable
nature of the channel only allow the game to be played with imperfect private information.
To solve the game, we propose a state machine based forwarding strategy which brings a
Sequential Equilibrium to the game. We also show that through carefully designing the
system parameters, the equilibrium points are attainable. To address the packet forwarding
problem in a multi-hop wireless network, we model a multi-player packet forwarding game
and extend our strategy to the multi-hop case, where Sequential Equilibrium can still be
obtained.
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CHAPTER 5
COEXISTENCE WITH MALICIOUS NODES
In Chapters 3 and 4, we focused on how to enforce the selfish nodes to cooperate. However,
another type of misbehavior in wireless network exists, viz, malicious attacking. In the
context of packet forwarding, attacking includes altering the contents of the packets, denial-
of-service attacks, malicious packet dropping, and so on. Identification and isolation of
malicious nodes in a distributed system is a challenging problem. This problem is even more
aggravated in wireless networks because the unreliable channel makes the actions of the nodes
hidden from each other. Therefore, a regular node in the network can only construct a belief
about a malicious node through monitoring and observation. In this chapter, we use game
theory to study the interactions between regular and malicious nodes in a wireless network.
In Section 5.1, we model the malicious node detection process as a Bayesian game with
imperfect information and show that a mixed strategy perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
(also a sequential equilibrium) is attainable. While the equilibrium in the detection game
ensures the identification of the malicious nodes, we argue that it might not be profitable
to isolate the malicious nodes upon detection. As a matter of fact, malicious nodes can co-
exist with regular nodes as long as the destruction they bring is less than the contribution
they make. To show how we can utilize the malicious nodes, a post-detection game between
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the malicious and regular nodes is formalized in Section 5.2. Solution to this game shows
the existence of a subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium and the conditions that achieve the
equilibrium. Further, in Section 5.3, we show how a malicious node can construct a nested
belief about the belief held by a regular node. By employing the nested belief system,
a Markov Perfect Bayes-Nash Equilibrium is reached and the equilibrium postpones the
detection of the malicious node.
5.1 Malicious Nodes Detection Game
We consider a wireless network consisting of Regular and Malicious nodes. By regular node
we mean that a node that works towards the common goal of the network. Also, it is
rational and its actions are governed by an underlying utility function. On the other hand,
a malicious node aims to hamper, disturb, and even attack the network. Although the
actions of a malicious node is also determined by certain utility functions, such functions are
designed to bring damages to the network.
Despite the two types of nodes, the identity (type) of a malicious node is not directly
revealed to others. Instead, the types can only be estimated or conjectured through ob-
serving actions. To identify the attacks and malicious nodes in the network, a regular node
can monitor the actions of others. However, such monitoring is costly (e.g., consumes the
receivers’ own resource) and a node cannot afford to monitor all the time. Moreover, the
observations might not be accurate because of the noise, e.g., wireless channel loss. Thus,
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the regular nodes do not monitor the network all the time and during those times, attacks
cannot be identified.
To simplify the analysis, our research focuses on the packet forwarding process. We
assume that node i, or the sender node, has a packet to send to node j, or the receiver
node. If the sender node is regular, it only takes the action “Forward”. If the sender node is
malicious, it can choose to “Attack” with a risk of being identified or “Forward” (not attack)
to disguise. We further assume that time is divided into slots and nodes take their actions
within each slot.
5.1.1 Detection Game Model
To abstract the interactions among the nodes, we consider a two-player non-zero sum game
played by the sender node i and the receiver node j. The types of these nodes, θi and θj,
are private information. Since the type of each player is hidden, and the observation is not
accurate, it is a Bayesian game with imperfect information [38].
To model the process of detecting the malicious nodes in the network, we apply a special
category of Bayesian game called the signaling game. A signaling game is played between a
sender and a receiver. The sender has a certain type and a set M of available messages to
be sent. Based on its knowledge on its own type, the sender chooses a message from M and
sends it to the receiver. However, the receiver does not know the type of the sender and can
only observe the message but not the type. Through observation, the receiver then takes an
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action in response to the message it observed. In the malicious node detection game, the
sender, node i can be either regular θi = 0 or malicious θi = 1. The receiver, node j is always
a regular node, i.e., θj = 0.
The action profiles ai available to node i are based on its type. For θi = 0, ai =
{Forward}. For θi = 1, ai ∈ {Attack, Forward}. The receiver node j has the option to
monitor if node i is attacking or not, thus aj ∈ {Monitor, Idle}.
To further construct the game, we define the following values. Let gA be the payoff of
a malicious node if it successfully attacks. The cost associated with such an attack is cA.
For the receiver node j, the cost of monitoring is cM and 0 if it is idle. Hence, for the
action profile (ai, aj) = (Attack, Idle), the net utility for a successful attacking node i
is gA − cA, the loss for node j is −gA due to the attack. Similarly, if the action profile is
(ai, aj) = (Attack, Monitor), the attacking malicious node i losses gA + cA, and the net
gain for node j is gA − cM . However, if a malicious node chooses not to attack, the cost to
forward a packet is cF , which is the same cost to a regular sender node. Based on the types
of node i and node j, the payoffs matrices are presented in Table 5.2. For quick reference,
the notations used in this chapter are tabulated in Table 5.1.
In addition, in our model, we introduce pe as the channel loss rate. The channel unrelia-
bility implies that monitoring can be accurate with probability 1− pe. We also denote γ as
the attack success rate for a malicious node.
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Node i (potential) malicious node, attacker
Node j regular node, monitor
θi type of node i, 1 for malicious, 0 for regular
ui, uj payoff of node i or j in the stage game
gA gain of successfully attack for node i
cA cost of any attack for node i
cF cost of forward (not attack) for node i
cM cost of monitoring for node j
φ the belief of node i being malicious in stage game
γ attack success rate for node i
pe channel error rate
α false alarm rate for node j
ai, aj action profile for node i or j
aˆi(t) node i’s action observed by node j in stage t
oi node i’s observation of its payoffs
µj(θi) belief node j holds about node i’s type in the dynamic game
µi(µj(θi)) belief node i holds about node j’s belief in the dynamic game
(used to derive the MPBNE)
σi, σj node i or j’s strategy profile
p, q random variable of probability node i attacks or node j monitors in the
malicious node detection game
p∗(t), q∗(t) random variable of probability node i attacks or node j monitors in the
post-detection game
p˜, q˜ random variable of probability node i attacks or node j monitors in the
malicious node detection game with node i’s nested belief model
Ci coexistence index
µ∗j node j’s belief about node i’s type when node i uses nested belief model
pj∗i node j’s belief about node i’s attack probability when node i uses
nested belief model
pM the value of node i’s attack probability in MPBNE
pPBE the value of node i’s attack probability in PBE
pSPNE the value of node i’s attack probability in SPNE
Table 5.1: Notations used in malicious nodes coexistence analysis.
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Node j
Monitor Idle
Node i
Attack −gA − cA gA − cM gA − cA −gA
Forward −cF −cM − cF 0
(a) θi = 1, malicious sender
Node j
Monitor Idle
Node i Forward −cF −cM − cF 0
(b) θi = 0, regular sender
Table 5.2: Payoff matrix of two player malicious node detection game.
5.1.2 Equilibrium Analysis for the Stage Game
We begin our analysis on the malicious node detection game from the extensive form of the
static Bayesian game as illustrated in Figure 5.1. We consider the type determination of
node i when θi = 1 happens with probability φ. To solve this game, we are interested in
finding the possible Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE). In a static Bayesian game, the BNE
is the Nash Equilibrium given the beliefs of both nodes. In our case, node i knows for sure
that for node j, θj = 0, however, node j’s belief about node i is that θi = 1 with probability
φ.
First, let us consider pure strategies only. Based on θi, the pure strategies available for
node i are σi = {(Attack if θi = 1, Forward if θi = 0), Forward ∀ θi}. For node j, the
strategy set is σj = {Monitor, Idle}. To find the BNE, we let σi and σj play with each other
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ForwardAttack
φ1− φ
IdleIdle Idle
Forward
Monitor
Monitor
Monitor
Nature
Figure 5.1: Stage malicious node detection game tree.
and derive the conditions under which neither node can increase its utility by unilaterally
changing its strategy.
Lemma 5.1. In the malicious node detection game, there is a malice belief threshold φ0,
such that no pure strategy BNE exists if φ > φ0.
Proof. We start by eliminating a trivial pure strategy pair (Forward ∀ θi Monitor). From
Table 5.25.2(a), we know that for both nodes, they can improve their payoffs by deviating
from the strategy pair. We further analyze the following two cases.
Case 1 : σi = (Attack if θi = 1, Forward if θi = 0). For node j, if σj = Monitor, the
expected payoff is
uj(Monitor) = φ(1− pe)(gA − cM)− φpe[γ(gA + cM) + (1− γ)cM ]− (1− φ)cM (5.1)
where each term represents monitoring the attack successfully, failing to monitor the attack,
and node i is regular respectively. If σj = Idle, the expected payoff is
uj(Idle) = −φγgA (5.2)
If (5.2)>(5.1), the dominant strategy for node j is Idle. Correspondingly, for node i, the best
response would be (Attack if θi = 1, Forward if θi = 0). Thus (σi, σj) = {(Attack if θi =
1, Forward if θi = 0), Idle} is a BNE under the condition that φ <
cM
(1−pe)(1+γ)gA
. If
(5.2)<(5.1), or φ > cM
(1−pe)(1+γ)gA
, the dominant strategy for node j is Monitor, however,
the best response to Monitor for node i is Forward ∀ θi. Hence (σi, σj) = {(Attack if θi =
1, Forward if θi = 0), Monitor} is not a BNE under the condition that φ >
cM
(1−pe)(1+γ)gA
.
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Case 2 : (σi, σj) = {(Forward ∀ θi, Idle}. If node j chooses not to monitor, the
best response for node i is to Attack if θi = 1. This will lead to the previous case when
φ < cM
(1−pe)(1+γ)gA
. Therefore, there is no BNE if (σi, σj) = {(Forward ∀ θi, Idle}.
To sum up, the pure strategy BNE exists if and only if φ < cM
(1−pe)(1+γ)gA
. The equilibrium
strategy profile is (σi, σj) = {(Attack if θi = 1, Forward if θi = 0), Idle}. In other words,
we can find φ0 =
cM
(1−pe)(1+γ)gA
, such that no pure strategy BNE exists if φ > φ0.
Although pure strategy BNE exists, it is not practical because the equilibrium requires
node j to be Idle at all times, and hence the malicious nodes cannot be detected. It is
also called Pooling Equilibrium [38] in which the receiver has no clue about sender’s type.
Therefore, it is desirable to seek a mixed-strategy BNE, and obviously, such BNE exists
when φ > φ0.
Let us denote p as the probability with which node i of type θi = 1 plays Attack and
q as the probability with which node j plays Monitor. To find the mixed strategy BNE of
this game, we need to find the values of p and q such that neither node i nor j can increase
payoff by altering the actions. For the mixed strategy played by node i, the payoff of node
j playing Monitor is
uj(Monitor) = φp[(1− pe)γ(gA − cM) + (1− pe)(1− γ)(gA − cM)
−pe(1− γ)cM − peγ(gA + cM)]− φ(1− p)cM − (1− φ)cM
= φ[1− pe(1 + γ)]pgA − cM . (5.3)
If node j plays Idle,
uj(Idle) = −φγpgA. (5.4)
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Thus, in the mixed BNE strategy, uj(Monitor) = uj(Idle). Thus p =
cM
φ(1−pe)(1+γ)gA
.
Similarly, when node j plays the mixed strategy, the payoff of node i playing Attack is
ui(Attack) = −(1− pe)q(gA + cA) + γ(1− q)(gA − cA)
+peγq(gA − cA)− pe(1− γ)qcA − (1− γ)(1− q)cA
= (pe − 1)(1 + γ)qgA + γgA − cA. (5.5)
When node i plays Forward,
ui(Forward) = −cF . (5.6)
Hence, to obtain q, ui(Attack) = ui(Forward), and q =
γgA−cA+cF
(1−pe)(1+γ)gA
.
To sum up the analysis, we state the following lemma.
Lemma 5.2. The malicious node detection game has a mixed strategy BNE when σi, σj =
{(Attack with cM
φ(1+γ)(1−pe)gA
if θi = 1, Forward if θi = 0), Monitor with
γgA−cA+cF
(1−pe)(1+γ)gA
},
given φ > φ0.
Lemmas 5.1 and 5.2 provide us with the conditions under which BNE can be attained.
One of the conditions is the belief of malice threshold φ0. As suggested in Lemma 5.1, this
threshold is related to the channel reliability (1− pe), attack success rate (γ) and detection
gain (gA/cM). In the pure strategy BNE, node i always attacks and the belief of node j
on node i’s malice is very low since the detection gain is usually very large as pe, γ ∈ [0, 1].
However, when the belief grows and eventually exceeds the threshold, the mixed strategy
BNE requires node i to be less aggressive in attacking. In other words, the equilibrium
implies node i should know about node j’s belief when making the decision. When node j
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is absolutely sure about node i’s type, node i’s equilibrium attack probability drops to the
value of the belief threshold.
5.1.3 Belief Update and Dynamic Bayesian Games
So far, the analysis on the malicious node detection stage game has shown that the equi-
librium is associated with node j’s belief on node i’s type. However, the difficulty lies in
the assignment of the belief as a priori information available to node j. Thus, it is desirable
that this belief can be accurately presented and dynamically updated. We apply dynamic
Bayesian game theory to discuss how the belief is updated.
We assume that the static malicious node detection game is repeatedly played at every
time slot, and we consider the infinite repeated game without discounting (i.e., payoffs in
every stage/slot have equal weight). In addition to the notation defined in the stage game,
we introduce µ
(t)
j (θi = θ¯i) as the belief node j holds about θi = θ¯i at the t
th stage of the
subgame. Since node j is always a regular node, µ
(t)
i (θj = 0) for all t > 0. We further define
ai(t) as the action node i plays at t
th stage. Node j may monitor node i’s actions through
the observed signal aˆi(t). The reasons for the discrepancy between ai(t) and aˆi(t) are the
observation error caused by the channel unreliability and the false alarm rate (α) caused by
the inaccuracy and limitation in the detection of node j.
Based on Bayes’ theorem, we construct our belief update rule. If node j is continuously
monitoring, its belief on θi can be calculated with the belief it holds at the immediate previous
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stage and the actions it observed. We write the belief at the (t+ 1)th stage as:
µ
(t+1)
j (θi) =
µ
(t)
j (θi)P (aˆi(t)|θi)∑
θ˜i∈Θ
µ
(t)
j (θ˜i)P (aˆi(t)|θ˜i)
, (5.7)
where Θ is the space of all possible values θi can take; in our case Θ = {0, 1}.
For each of the terms in equation (5.7), we have the following equations.
P (aˆi(t) = Attack|θi = 1) = (1− pe)p+ α(1− p) (5.8)
P (aˆi(t) = Attack|θi = 0) = α (5.9)
P (aˆi(t) = Forward|θi = 1) = pep+ (1− α)(1− p) (5.10)
P (aˆi(t) = Forward|θi = 0) = 1− α. (5.11)
Since node j does not monitor node i’s actions at every stage, but rather with probability
q. When node j is not monitoring, its belief remains the same at the next stage. Thus,
Equation (5.7) is revised as:
µ
(t+1)
j (θi) = q
µ
(t)
j (θi)P (aˆi(t)|θi)∑
θ˜i∈Θ
µ
(t)
j (θ˜i)P (aˆi(t)|θ˜i)
+ (1− q)µ
(t)
k (θi). (5.12)
The concept of belief system is hence introduced to describe the aforementioned belief
building and updating process. A belief system is a function that assigns each information
set1 a probability distribution over the histories (i.e., past moves and states) in that infor-
mation set [38]. Although in our discussions above, we did not explicitly state how history is
1An information set is a set of all the possible moves that could have taken place in the game so far, for
a particular player, given what that player has observed. In an imperfect information game, an information
set contains all possible states in the history, e.g., in Figure 5.1, the dotted lines show the information set
available to node j.
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accounted for in equations (5.7) and (5.12), it is easy to observe that every updated belief is
determined by the actions node j observes in the current stage and the belief it holds. The
beliefs are further determined by the actions in the previous stages and it can be backtracked
to the initial belief and the subsequent actions. Thus, the current belief and observed action
can fully represent the histories in the information sets, and those information sets can be
reached with positive probabilities if the strategies are carefully designed.
With the belief system, the games are played in a sequential manner. As the game
evolves, neither nodes can stick to the very same strategy at every stage to yield the most
payoffs. Thus, the best response strategies are dependent on the current beliefs held by the
nodes. Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) can be applied to characterize the aforemen-
tioned dependency. In PBE, the belief system is updated by Bayes’ rule. PBE also demands
the optimality of subsequent play given the belief. Next, we show how to construct a PBE
in the dynamic malicious node detection game.
We first show the existence of a mixed strategy equilibrium and then argue the infeasi-
bility of the pure strategy equilibrium. Consider an arbitrary stage k of the game; we denote
p(k) as the probability node i of type θi = 1 plays Attack, q
(k) as the probability node j plays
Monitor. In the equilibrium, u
(k)
i (Attack) = u
(k)
i (Forward) and u
(k)
j (Monitor) = u
(k)
j (Idle).
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In particular,
u
(k)
i (a
(k)
i = Attack|a
(k)
j = Monitor) = −(1− pe)q
(k)(gA + cA) + γ(1− q
(k))(gA − cA)
+γq(k)pe(gA − cA)− pe(1− γ)q
(k)cA − (1− γ)(1− q
(k))cA (5.13)
u
(k)
i (a
(k)
i = Forward|a
(k)
j = Monitor) = −cF . (5.14)
u
(k)
j (a
(k)
j = Monitor|a
(k)
i = Attack) = µ
(k)
j (θi = 1)p
(k)[(1− pe)γ(gA − cM)
+(1− pe)(1− γ)(gA − cM)− pe(1− γ)cM − peγ(gA + cM)]− µ
(k)
j (θi = 1)(1− p
(k))cM
−µ
(k)
j (θi = 0)cM (5.15)
u
(k)
j (a
(k)
j = Idle|a
(k)
i = Attack) = −µ
(k)
j (θi = 1)γp
(k)gA. (5.16)
The solutions to the above equations are
p(k) =
cM
µ
(k)
j (θi = 1)(1− pe)(1 + γ)gA
(5.17)
q(k) =
γgA − cA + cF
(1− pe)(1 + γ)gA
. (5.18)
What p(k) and q(k) suggest is an equilibrium profile (σ
(k)
i , σ
(k)
j ). This profile shows the
sequential rationality [16, 38], that is, each node’s strategy is optimal whenever it has to
move, given its belief and the other node’s strategy. In other words, for any alternative
strategies σ
′(k)
i and σ
′(k)
j ,
u
(k)
i ((σ
(k)
i , σ
(k)
j )|θi, ai(t), µ
(k)
j (θi)) ≥ u
(k)
i ((σ
′(k)
i , σ
(k)
j )|θi, ai(t), µ
(k)
j (θi)) (5.19)
u
(k)
j ((σ
(k)
i , σ
(k)
j )|θi, aˆi(t), µ
(k)
j (θi)) ≥ u
(k)
j ((σ
(k)
i , σ
′(k)
j )|θi, aˆi(t), µ
(k)
j (θi)) (5.20)
Besides sequential rationality, a PBE also demands that the belief system satisfies the
Bayesian conditions [16].
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Definition 5.1. ([16], pp. 331-332) The Bayesian conditions defined for PBE are
B(i): Posterior beliefs are independent. For history h(k), µi(θ−i|θi, h
(k)) =
∏
j 6=i µi(θj|h
(k)).
B(ii): Bayes’ rule is used to update beliefs whenever possible.
B(iii): Nodes do not signal what they do not know.
B(iv): Posterior beliefs are consistent for all nodes with a common joint distribution on
θ given h(k).
Our proposed belief system satisfies the Bayesian conditions. B(i) is satisfied because
θj = 0 all the time. Equation (5.7) is derived from Bayes’ rule, and hence B(ii) is also
satisfied. B(iii) is fulfilled because node i’s signal is determined by its action and if ai(k) =
aˆi(k), µj(θi|ai(k), h
(k)
j ) = µj(θi|aˆi(k), h
(k)
j ). B(iv) is trivial in our game because no third
player exists.
The analysis on Bayesian conditions and sequential rationality serves as the proof of the
following theorem.
Theorem 5.1. The dynamic malicious node detection game has a perfect Bayesian equilib-
rium that can be attained with strategy profile (σ
(k)
i , σ
(k)
j ) = (p
(k), q(k)).
Remark 1: The infeasibility of pure strategy PBE is proved as follows: If node i
attacks, the best response for node j is Monitor, which makes node i non-profitable to
play Attack. If node i plays Forward, p(k) = 0, the best response for node j is Idle (i.e.,
q(k) = 0). However, the sequential rationality requires q(k) ≥ gAγ−cA+cF
gA(1−pe)(1+γ)
, which leads to
a contradiction. Therefore, no pure strategy PBE exists in the dynamic malicious node
detection game. It is noted that the infeasibility of the pure strategy PBE in the dynamic
settings should not be confused with the existence of a pure strategy BNE in a static game
because the pure strategy BNE in a static game is always an artifact.
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Remark 2: The proved PBE can be further refined to Sequential Equilibrium [24]. In
the sequential equilibrium, the Bayesian conditions are extended as belief sensibility and
consistency. The belief sensibility requires the information sets can be reached with positive
probabilities (µ) given the strategy profile σ. The consistency demands an assessment (σ, µ)
should be a limit point of a sequence of the mixed strategies and associated sensible beliefs,
i.e., (σ, µ) = limn→∞(σ
n, µn). In our game, belief sensibility is satisfied because our proposed
belief system updates the beliefs according to Bayes’ rule and it assigns a positive probability
to each of the information set. Theorem 8.2 in [16] states that in incomplete information
multi-stage games, if neither player has more than 2 types, Bayesian condition is equivalent
to belief consistency requirement. In our game, θi = 0, 1, θj = 0, and hence consistency is
fulfilled. Together with the sequential rationality, the PBE in our game is also a sequential
equilibrium. Since every finite extensive-form game has at least one sequential equilibrium,
which is a refinement to PBE, it also implies the existence of PBE in our game.
5.2 Post-detection Game and Coexistence
In the previous section, we have discussed how to update node j’s belief system based on
Bayes’ rule. It is natural that through observation, although imperfect at every stage game,
node j can accumulate a better estimation about θi. Eventually, after repeated monitoring,
there will be a stage at which node j can predict with confidence whether node i is regular
or malicious.
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5.2.1 Post-detection Game Model
Traditionally speaking, after node j has identified node i as a malicious node, it will try to
report and isolate node i immediately to prevent future attacks. However, there are also
situations where “isolation” may not be a good choice. Let us consider a wireless network
which operates on a limited resource budget. In order to prolong the lifetime of the network,
every regular node has to be economical towards packet forwarding. Hence, if a malicious
node can be used to handle some of the traffic, it is beneficial not to isolate it.
However, there is a trade-off between how much benefit a malicious node can bring and
what damage it can do. We denote nF and nA as the number of successful forwarding actions
and number of attacks taken by a malicious node. Recall the cost of forwarding is cF and
the loss due to an attack to the network is gA. Thus, for a regular node, if it observes that
the total saving due to forwarding (nF cF ) a malicious node contributes is greater than the
total cost due to its attack (nAgA), then keeping that node in the network is profitable. It is
also worthwhile to mention that although the values of cF and gA vary from one application
to another, for a given application, the values are constant and measurable.
To further analyze the conditions under which a malicious node can be kept and coexist
with the regular ones, we formally define the post detection game. The game has two players:
node i and node j, both nodes know the types of their opponent, i.e., node j knows that
node i is malicious but has not taken any action to isolate it. Thus, θi = 1, θj = 0. The
actions available for node i is ai ∈ {Attack, Forward}, while the actions for node j is
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aj ∈ {Monitor, Idle}. When node j monitors, it keeps a record of what node i has done
since the beginning of the game. It also calculates a coexistence index Ci = nˆF cF − nˆAgA
for node i, where nˆF is the observed number of forwarding actions and nˆA is the observed
number of attacks. If Ci falls under a certain threshold τ , node j will isolate node i and
terminate the post-detection game because keeping node i is no longer beneficial. If Ci ≥ τ ,
the game will be played in a repeated manner. The payoff matrix for the post-detection
game is the same as the detection game for θi = 1 as was shown in Table 5.25.2(a).
5.2.2 Searching for a Coexistence Equilibrium
Let us explore the strategies that both nodes can take to reach the equilibrium of coexistence.
To avoid confusion, we denote p∗(t) and q∗(t) as the probability node i plays Attack and
node j playsMonitor respectively with time. It is noted that these probabilities are different
from the ones we obtained in Chapter 5.1.3. Also, since this game is no longer Bayesian, we
are more interested in obtaining a subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium.
We first derive the Nash Equilibrium using indifference conditions. Suppose the post-
detection game is played at tth repetition, i.e., subgame t. The expected payoff for player j
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playing Monitor is
u
(k)
j (Monitor) = {p
∗(k)[(1− pe)γ(gA − cM) + (1− pe)(1− γ)(gA − cM)− pe(1− γ)cM
− peγ(gA + cM)]}Pr(Ci ≥ τ) + (1− pe)p
∗(k)(gA − cM) Pr(Ci < τ)− (1− p
∗(k))cM
= [(1− pe + γpe)gA − cM ]p
∗(k) Pr(Ci ≥ τ) + (1− pe)p
∗(k)(gA − cM) Pr(Ei < τ)
− (1− p∗(k))cM .
(5.21)
If node j plays Idle, the expected payoff is always
u
(k)
j (Idle) = −γp
∗(k)gA. (5.22)
Thus, the indifference condition require u
(k)
j (Monitor) = u
(k)
j (Idle), and hence p
∗ is
obtained as:
p∗(k)
cM
[(1− pe + γpe)gA − cM ] Pr(Ci ≥ τ) + (1− pe)(gA − cM) Pr(Ci < τ) + cM + γgA
.
(5.23)
Similarly, we can apply the indifference condition to node i as:
u
(k)
i (Attack) = q
∗(k){−(1− pe)(gA + cA) Pr(Ci < τ)
+ (1− pe)[γ(gA − cA)− (1− γ)cA] Pr(Ci ≥ τ) + peγ(gA − cA)− pe(1− γ)cA}
− (1− q∗(k))[(1− γ)cA − γ(gA − cA)]
= q∗(k){−(1− pe)(gA + cA) Pr(Ci < τ) + (γgA − cA)[(1− pe) Pr(Ci ≥ τ) + pe]}
+ (1− q∗(k))(γgA − cA). (5.24)
u
(k)
i (Forward) = −cF . (5.25)
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Therefore, q∗ can be expressed as:
q∗(k) =
cA − γgA − cF
−(1− pe)(gA + cA) Pr(Ci < τ) + (1− pe)(γgA − cA)(Pr(Ci ≥ τ)− 1)
(5.26)
The problem is then reduced to obtaining the probability distribution of Ci. Let us
assume at the beginning of the post-detection game Ci = c0 ≥ τ . For the sake of discussion,
we also assume that node j is constantly monitoring. Hence, if we consider l subgames, in
each of the subgame, Ci is updated.
We denote a random variable y = Ci = c0+ nˆF cF− nˆAgA. Since the mixed strategy profile
requires node i to choose Attack with probability p∗, nˆF and nˆA are binomially distributed
as:
Pr(nˆF = NˆF ) = C
NˆF
l [(1− p
∗(t))(1− pe)]
NˆF [1− (1− p∗(t))(1− pe)]
l−NˆF (5.27)
Pr(nˆA = NˆA) = C
NˆA
l [p
∗(t)(1− pe)]
NˆF [1− p∗(t)(1− pe)]
l−NˆF (5.28)
Since y = c0+nˆF cF−nˆAgA = c0+nˆF cF−(l−nˆF )gA = (cF+gA)nˆF−lgA+c0 and l, cF , gA, c0
are constants, to get the distribution of y, we first get the distribution of w = y + lgA − c0.
We use the probability generation function (pgf). For discrete random variable x, its pgf
is defined as
GX(z) = E[z
X ] =
∞∑
x=0
zx Pr(X = x) (5.29)
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The pgf for w is
GW (z) = E[z
W ] = E[zNˆF (cF+gA)]
= {
l∑
nˆf=0
znC
nˆf
l [(1− p
∗(t))(1− pe)]
nˆf [1− (1− p∗)(1− pe)]
l−nˆf}(cF+gA)
= {(1− p∗(t))(1− pe) + [1− (1− p
∗(t))(1− pe)]z}
(cF+gA)l
(5.30)
Let f (n)(x) = ∂
nf(x)
∂xn
,
P(w = ω) =
G
(ω)
W (0)
ω!
(5.31)
The probability terms in (5.23) and (5.26) are given by,
Pr(Ci ≥ τ) = Pr(w ≥ lgA + τ − c0) =
∑
n≥lgA+τ
G
(n)
W (0)
n!
(5.32)
Pr(Ci < τ) = 1−
∑
n≥lgA+τ−c0
G
(n)
W (0)
n!
(5.33)
To relax the assumption of node j’s constant monitoring, the current stage t for the
analysis is ⌈t = l/q∗(t)⌉. Therefore, we have obtained the equilibrium strategy parameter
p∗(t) and q∗(t) for every subgame.
So far, we have shown that for the mixed strategy profile, attaining a Nash Equilibrium is
feasible. As a matter of fact, every game has a mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium. To further
refine the equilibrium, we apply the One-Shot Deviation Property to derive the condition
for subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium.
We take node j as an example and assume the repeated game has no discount. In our
previous equilibrium analysis using the indifference condition, we have proved that deviation
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from p∗(t) or q∗(t) will not increase the payoffs. Hence, in the following derivation, we show
the deviation strategy is related to Ci.
From (5.21) and (5.22), we can express the expected payoff for node j as:
Uj =
T∑
t=0
q∗(t){[gA(1− pe + γpe)− cM ]p
∗(t) Pr(Ci ≥ τ)
+ (gA − cM)p
∗(t)(1− pe) Pr(Ci < τ)− (1− p
∗(t))cM} − (1− q
∗(t))p∗(t)γgA.(5.34)
Suppose node j deviates at rth stage and r ≤ T . The deviation can be either of the
following two cases.
Case 1 : Isolate node i while Ci ≥ τ . In this case, if node j attacks and is successfully
observed, it will be isolated. The expected payoff at this stage for node j is
U
(r)
j,dev,1 = {q
∗(t){p∗(t)(1− pe)(gA − cM)− p
∗(t)γpe(gA + cM)
− [p∗(t)(1− γ)pe + (1− p
∗(t))]cM} − (1− q
∗(t))p∗(t)γgA}Pr(Ci ≥ τ) (5.35)
Case 2 : Keep node i while Ci < τ . Since node j only deviates one stage, node i will be
isolated in the next stage. The expected payoff for node j at this stage is the same as above
expect for the last probability term.
U
(r)
j,dev,2 = {q
∗(t){p∗(t)(1− pe)(gA − cM)− p
∗(t)γpe(gA + cM)
− [p∗(t)(1− γ)pe + (1− p
∗(t))]cM} − (1− q
∗(t))p∗(t)γgA}Pr(Ci < τ) (5.36)
In this way, the total expected payoff for node j under deviation is
Uj,dev =
r−1∑
t=0
U
(t)
j + U
(r)
j,dev,1 + U
(r)
j,dev,2 +
T∑
t=r+1
U
(t)
j (5.37)
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OSDP require Uj,dev ≤ Uj. After algebraic manipulation, we have
gAγ(q
∗(t)pe + 1) + q
∗(t)pe(γcM + 1− γ)
≥ (1− q∗(t))γgA + q
∗(t)[γgA Pr(Ci < τ) + pecM Pr(Ci ≥ τ)] (5.38)
or
gAγ[pe + 1− Pr(Ci < τ)] ≥ pe[cM Pr(Ci ≥ τ) + γ − 1− γcM ]. (5.39)
To sum up, for the equilibrium on the post-detection game, we state the following theo-
rem.
Theorem 5.2. The post-detection game has a mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium when node
i attacks with p∗(t) and node j monitors with q∗(t). This strategy is also subgame perfect if
gAγ[pe + 1− Pr(Ci < τ)] ≥ pe[cM Pr(Ci ≥ τ) + γ − 1− γcM ].
5.2.3 Convergence of the Coexistence Equilibrium
The post-detection game described above ends when Ci < τ . Since Pr(Ci < τ) > 0, the game
is of finite stages. In this subsection, we try to derive the expected length (number of stages)
of the game.
We focus on the random variable Ci. As we mentioned earlier, Ci = c0 + nˆF cF − nˆAgA.
Again, we assume node j is constantly monitoring. After one stage game, the probability of
nˆF = nˆF +1 is (1− p
∗(t))(1− pe), and the probability of nˆA = nˆA+1 is p
∗(t)(1− pe). Thus,
we model the evolution of Ci as a random process similar to a 1-dimensional random walk,
where the value of Ci increases by cF with probability (1−p
∗(t))(1−pe), and decreases by gA
with probability p∗(t)(1− pe). The 1− pe term comes from the unreliability of the channel.
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To obtain the expected length of the post-detection game, it is equivalent to calculating the
expected first hitting time of the random process with the absorbing boundary Ci = τ .
Theorem 5.3. The expect length of the post-detection game is
∑
η>0
η
(
η
nˆF
)
−
∑nˆF−1
d
( (c0−τ)/cF+d
gA/cF
+d
d
)(η− (c0−τ)/cF+d
gA/cF
−d
nˆF−d
)
2η
.
Proof. Let η be a random variable representing the first hitting time. We assume that time
is divided into slots and each slot represent a stage game. It is easy to see that η = nˆF + nˆA.
At every slot, the random process has 2 possible evolution directions, i.e., nˆF + 1 or nˆA + 1.
Therefore, for η slots, there are 2η possible realizations.
We try to calculate how many paths hit the boundary exactly on the ηth slot. The
following notations are made. Let m = gA
cF
, s = (c0 − τ)/cF and m, s are integers. In
Figure 5.2, we interpret how to move on a grid according to a random process. Consider
a random walk from the left bottom point. If nˆF increases, move one block right. If nˆA
increases, move m blocks up. While each block is a squarelet with the length cF , the width
of the grid is nˆF cF , the height is gAnˆA, and diagonal line represents Ci = τ . Each walk
consists of η moves and must end on or beyond the upper rightmost corner. What we are
interested in is the number of monotonic paths that wholly falls under the diagonal line,
because each of those paths is a realization of the random process which hits the boundary
for the first time at the ηth slot.
While counting the number of realizations under the diagonal line might be difficult, we
calculate the realizations that do cross the line. Let the number of realizations crossing the
line be M , the number of realizations under the line is then C nˆFn −M , where C
nˆF
n is the total
number of possible realizations on the grid. Consider a sample realization crossing the line
as shown in Figure 5.2. Let d be the number of horizontal steps taken in the path before
hitting the diagonal line. To hit the line, at least s+d
m
vertical steps should be taken, covering
a total height of (d + s)cF . The total number of such paths is
∑
dC
d
s+d
m
+d
. After hitting
the line, the rest of the path should consist of nˆF − d vertical steps and the total number
of moves left is η − s+d
m
− d. So, the total number of paths that cross the diagonal line is
M =
∑nˆF−1
d C
d
s+d
m
+d
C nˆF−d
η− s+d
m
−d
.
To sum up, out of 2η realizations, C nˆFn −
∑nˆF−1
d C
d
s+d
m
+d
C nˆF−d
η− s+d
m
−d
realizations hit the
diagonal line for the first time at the ηth move. The probability of game length being η
is then
C
nˆF
η −
∑nˆF−1
d C
d
s+d
m +d
C
nˆF−d
η− s+dm −d
2η
. Finally, we can express the expected length of the post
detection game as
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Figure 5.2: Realizations of the random walk.
E[length] =
∑
η>0
η
C nˆFη −
∑nˆF−1
d
( s+d
m
+d
d
)(
η− s+d
m
−d
nˆF−d
)
2η
. (5.40)
5.3 Countermeasures for the Malicious Node
In our discussions so far, we haven shown that it is feasible to design strategies in order
to achieve the proposed PBE in the malicious node detection game. However, there are
still some issues that must be resolved before the equilibrium strategies can be applied and
followed by practitioners. These issues can be categorized into two aspects. First, the PBE
requires the malicious node perfectly know the belief held by the regular node. However, in
practice, the belief information is never shared. Second, the malicious node may not remain
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passive in the detection game; instead, it can also form its belief about the current status in
the game and adjust its strategy accordingly.
It is natural that not only the regular node but also the malicious node (node i) study the
game through observation. In particular, node i understands that although the unreliable
channel makes the observations inaccurate, the more often it attacks, the quicker node j can
form a correct belief about its malicious type. Thus, node j should take different strategies
when different beliefs are held by node j. These strategies (e.g., the PBE strategy in equation
(5.17)) are Markovian when we view the beliefs as a set of states. The Markovian strategies
adopted by node i is only determined by the current state of the belief, i.e., when the belief
update process takes place. However, the belief held by node j is its private information,
and by no means can node i access this information. Therefore, it is essential for node i to
construct its own belief system, which is the belief on the belief node j holds towards node
i and we call this belief developed by node i nested belief.
We denote µi(µj(θi)) as the belief node i holds about node j’s belief about node i, i.e.,
µi(µj(θi)) is the nested belief about µj(θi). For the game we presented in Table 5.2(a),
depending on the actions nodes i and j take, the payoff of node i, ui, can be one of the three
different values: −gA − cA, gA − cA or −cF . While the observations of the payoffs are node
i’s private information, given a specific observation oi, node i can predict the actions taken
by node j, despite the prediction may be inaccurate. For example, when oi = −gA − cA,
node i knows for sure aj = Monitor. However, when oi = −cF , node i cannot tell what node
i has done. Further, based on the prediction of the actions node j takes, node i can update
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its belief µi(µj(θi)) on how node j’s belief µj(θi) has changed due to aj. Continuing with the
same examples, when oi = −gA− cA, aj = Monitor, so node j observes the Attack launched
by node i and it will update µj(θi) according to equation 5.7. Similarly, when oi = gA − cA,
node i knows that node j is idle and µj(θi) will not change. However, the uncertainty comes
when oi = −cF , where node i cannot accurately update its belief about µj(θi).
To construct the belief update system for node i, we employ the Bayes’ Theorem. At
stage t of the game, based on the observation o
(t)
i , node i’s belief µi(θi) is updated as:
µ
(t+1)
i (µj(θi)) =
µ
(t)
i (µj(θi))P (o
(t)
i |θi)∑
θ˜i∈Θ
µ
(t)
i (µj(θ˜i))P (o
(t)
i |θ˜i)
, (5.41)
where Θ={0,1}.
The conditional probabilities of observing oi given its type θi can be calculated as follows.
To distinguish from the strategy profiles we used previously, we denote p˜ as the probability
node i launches attacks, and q˜ as the probability node j monitors. Therefore, the probabilities
that arise due to the different observations and node i’s type are:
P (o
(t)
i = −gA − cA|θi = 1) = (1− pe)p˜q˜ + α(1− p˜)q˜ (5.42)
P (o
(t)
i = −gA − cA|θi = 0) = αq˜ (5.43)
P (o
(t)
i = gA − cA|θi = 1) = p˜[peq˜ + (1− q˜)] (5.44)
P (o
(t)
i = gA − cA|θi = 0) = 0 (5.45)
P (o
(t)
i = −cF |θi = 1) = (1− p˜)[(1− α)q˜ + (1− q˜)] (5.46)
P (o
(t)
i = −cF |θi = 0) = (1− α)q˜. (5.47)
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With the above equations, for each of the observations oi ∈ O, where O = {−gA −
cA, gA − cA, − cF}, µ
(t+1)
i (θi) is updated independently. Since for the malicious node i, its
type θi = 1 is known to itself, the overall belief is hence updated considering each of the
possible observations.
µ
(t+1)
i (µj(θi)) =
∑
oi∈O
P (o
(t)
i |1)
µ
(t)
i (µj(θi))P (o
(t)
i |θi)∑
θ˜i∈Θ
µ
(t)
i (µj(θ˜i))P (o
(t)
i |θ˜i)
. (5.48)
Further, with the belief system of node i, the malicious node detection game can be
solved again to obtain the sequential rationality. The derivation process is similar to what
we have presented in equations (5.13) to (5.16), with the exception that µ
(k)
i (µj(θi)) will be
considered. The equilibrium strategy profiles that reaches sequential rationality are,
p˜(t) =
cM
µ
(t)
i (µj(θi = 1))(1− pe)(1 + γ)gA
(5.49)
q˜(t) =
gAγ − cA + cF
(1− pe)(1 + γ)gA
. (5.50)
Moreover, it is easy to justify that the belief update process for node i also satisfies the
Bayesian condition in Definition 5.1. In addition, equation (5.49) suggests that node i’s
strategy is purely dependent on the current belief it holds. Thus, we can further refine the
PBE in malicious detection game.
Theorem 5.4. With the nested belief system for node i, the dynamic malicious node de-
tection game has a Markov Perfect Bayes-Nash Equilibrium (MPBNE) when the strategy
profiles are (σ
(t)
i , σ
(t)
j )=(p˜
(t), q˜(t)).
The equilibrium is called Markov because the strategies associated are Markovian based
on the beliefs. It is noted that the PBE obtained in Theorem 5.1 is also a MPBNE, however,
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the strategy profile has limited applicability because the equilibrium profile for node i requires
the knowledge of node j’s state (belief). On the contrary, the profiles in Theorem 5.4 only
rely on the private information available to the nodes themselves.
A special case for the strategy profile σi is “Always attack when µ
(k)
i (µj(θi = 1)) < µ¯ and
forward otherwise, for a predefined threshold µ¯ ∈(0, 1)”. In this strategy, when µ
(k)
i (µj(θi =
1)) < µ¯, p˜ = 1 and node j will progressively update its belief when it monitors because node
i is always behaving maliciously. However, when the belief threshold is reached, node i will
refrain from launching attacks, and hence its payoff will decrease. It is clear that the strategy
deviates from the MPBNE because p˜ does not adhere to the equilibrium. As a result, node i
will be identified quickly and it will be dormant for the rest of the time. While this strategy
is favorable to node j and the network, from node i’s perspective, this strategy will limit its
attacks and hence it is not desirable.
5.4 Summary
In this chapter, we apply game theory to study the coexistence of malicious and regular
nodes. We formulate a malicious node detection game and a post-detection game played
by the regular and malicious nodes. While both games are of imperfect information type,
we show that the former game has a mixed strategy perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium
and provide a solution to achieve that equilibrium. For the latter game, a coexistence
index is proposed. We also prove that keeping the coexistence index above a threshold, the
94
post-detection game has a subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium which is also the coexistence
equilibrium for malicious and regular nodes. We also propose a nested belief system that
can be used by the malicious node to predict if it has been detected. We also prove the
existence of a Markov Perfect Bayes-Nash Equilibrium when both nodes constantly update
their beliefs.
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CHAPTER 6
EXPERIMENTAL STUDY
In this chapter, we discuss the experimental studies that we conduct to validate the theo-
retic models we developed in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. Our experimental findings are presented
in the same order as the analysis, i.e., cooperation in the homogeneous channel, coopera-
tion in the heterogeneous channel, and coexistence with malicious attackers. In particular,
Section 6.1 shows the games played by a cooperation enforcement strategy and a collusion
strategy with homogeneous noise. In Section 6.2, we setup a multi-hop wireless network
scenario with heterogeneous channel conditions and study the performance of our proposed
state machine based cooperation enforcement schemes. Finally, in Section 6.3, we illustrate
attacker detection process and show the network properties when the equilibria are reached.
6.1 Anti-collusion Game
To illustrate how the dynamics of the population evolves and how collusion can be resisted
in the packet forwarding, we represent our findings through simulation which is based on
the framework proposed in [35]. In the simulation, a total number of 100 nodes adopting
two different strategies are considered. Homogeneous noise is added to simulate the channel
unreliability. We take the average population share over five simulation runs and plot how
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the population evolves as the games are played. The strategies adopted by the nodes are
CORE and a naive collusion strategy (CS) defined as follows:
Definition 6.1. Naive Collusion Strategy (CS): Forward all packets from the colluding group,
discard all packets from outside of the group. i.e.,
pi =
{
1 if node −i is also a colluding node.
0 otherwise
0 20 40 60 80 100
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Repetition of games
Po
pu
la
tio
n 
sh
ar
e
 
 
CS, x
c
0
=0.5
CORE, x
*
0
=0.5
CS, x
c
0
=0.3
CORE, x
*
0
=0.7
Figure 6.1: The effect of initial population share.
In Figure 6.1, we show how the population evolves with different initial population share.
The plots are obtained with pe = 0.2, α = 1.1. For CORE, we consider a history of last 10
steps (b = 10). With the parameter settings, Theorem 3.1 infers that CORE is SPNE. It is
very clear from the plots that the population adopting CORE overtakes that adopting CS
and the games eventually converge to a point where all the population adheres to CORE, i.e.,
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all the nodes are cooperative. It is also suggested that a larger initial cooperative population
(x0∗ = 0.7) leads to a faster convergence of the population evolution.
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Figure 6.2: The effect of history length of CORE.
We further study how the reputation history length b affects the performance of CORE.
In Figure 6.2, we compare the population evolution of three different values of b. While the
rest of the parameter settings remain the same, we only focus on the population dynamics of
CORE. Although the results show that cooperation can be enforced with CORE, the conver-
gence rates are different. The comparison states that large values of b help fast convergence.
This is due to the longer history it takes into account, the less observation error it is likely
to make.
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Figure 6.3: The effect of channel unreliability.
Figure 6.3 presents the effect of the channel unreliability on the population dynamics.
The plots clearly imply that the more reliable the channel is, the faster cooperation can be
enforced.
Figure 6.4 shows the combined effect of incentive value α and the initial population share.
The first observation is that with a small α, the population converges faster than that of
a larger α. This is because when α is large, the more benefit colluding can get and hence
the evolution takes a longer time. Another interesting observation is that with the same
α value, very small initial population share (x0∗ = 0.2) fails to reach the +1 population
state (i.e., cooperation). The reason behind is the effect of SPNE. In Theorem 3.2, we have
shown that cooperation can only be obtained if the cooperative strategy is ESS or the initial
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population reaches a threshold. In case of Figure 6.4, the SPNE condition of CORE requires
α < 1
1−pe
= 1.25, so when α = 2, CORE is no longer an ESS. Thus, a small initial population
share will not be able to lead the entire population to cooperation.
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Figure 6.4: SPNE and the population dynamics.
6.2 Multihop Cooperation Enforcement
In this section, we evaluate our state machine based cooperation enforcement packet for-
warding strategies by simulation. We also show the network performance under the proposed
strategies.
We consider 50 nodes that are randomly scattered in an area of 1000m×1000m. The
physical communication range is set to be 250m. During the simulation, log-distance path
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loss with exponent of 3 is adopted as the propagation model, and IEEE 802.11 is the under-
lying MAC protocol with a bandwidth of 2 Mbps. The data packet size is 64 bytes carried
by Constant Bit Rate (CBR) type of traffic with 2 packet per second, unless specially men-
tioned. We allow only one data session at a time. The data sessions originate and terminate
at randomly selected source and destination nodes. For the routing based packet forwarding
strategy, a DSR like routing agent is in place to handle the route discovery and maintenance.
For the hop-by-hop forwarding, GPSR like forwarding is employed and it finds the reachable
node with minimum distance to the destination as the next hop. The source nodes have
equal probability in selecting the forwarding type.
To simulate the repeated nature of the packet forwarding games, any node pair engaged
in packet forwarding, play a number of games with respect to the discount factor δ defined as
a system parameter. For a given δ, the average number of subgames is 1/(1− δ). Therefore,
in our simulation, a data session has at least 1/(1 − δ) packets with one packet forwarding
as a game.
The simulation runs for 1000 seconds with different channel loss probabilities. pe is set
to a random number in [0.01, 0.2] as the default value.
Our investigation starts with the one hop packet forwarding (i.e., two-player packet for-
warding game). We set the game payoff matrix as T = 0.8, R = 0.7, P = 0.1 and δ = 0.99.
Figure 6.5 shows the average payoff for each of the nodes using our state machine based
forwarding strategy. For comparison, we plot the payoff for “Full Cooperation” strategy as
well. Full cooperation implies node will always forward others packet unconditionally. The
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theoretical boundaries for our proposed strategy are also presented. The plot shows that the
payoffs of the proposed strategy are within the theoretical limits developed in Corollary 4.2.
Also, it is observed that the payoffs are very close to the unconditional “Full Cooperation”
strategy. The average payoffs are much closer to the upper bound than the lower bound
because when the games reach sequential equilibria, mutual cooperation is enforced.
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Figure 6.5: Average node payoff for state machine based forwarding strategy.
Figure 6.6 presents the average node payoffs with different channel loss probabilities pe
and discount factor δ. Note that δ = 0.999 implies 1000 subgames played while δ = 0.99
implies 100 subgames. The plots provide two insights. (1) As the channel becomes more
unreliable, the average payoff drops. (2) The more games played, the more average payoff is
generated. These observations also suggest that it is more desirable to have more packets in
one continuous data session before switching for another relaying nodes.
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Figure 6.6: Average node payoff with different channel loss probability and discount factor.
We show the equilibrium nature of the proposed state machine based forwarding strategy
in Figure 6.7. The payoffs of deviation strategies are plotted. In the deviation strategies,
when the node in state C, it always plays Discard with probability qC = 0.1 or qC = 0.15
(Recall that in our equilibrium strategy, qC is a very small value.). In this setting, δ = 0.999
and pe = 0.01. Figure 6.7 clearly shows that the payoffs with our proposed strategy are
strictly greater that the deviation strategies.
To further evaluate our proposed strategies, we consider the network performance. In
Figure 6.8, we present the normalized network throughput at δ = 0.99. We denote 1 as the
state that all the generated packets are successfully delivered from source to destination. It is
shown that with a small channel loss probability (pe = 0.01), our proposed Multi-hop Packet
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Forwarding Strategy (MHPFS) reaches almost the same throughput as the fully cooperative
strategy. With a larger pe, the throughput difference between MHPFS and the unconditional
cooperation case is larger.
0 10 20 30 40 50
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
Node id
Av
er
ag
e 
No
de
 p
ay
of
f
 
 
payoff upper bound
payoff using our proposed strategy
payoff using deviation strategy qC=0.1
payoff using deviation strategy qC=0.15
Figure 6.7: Average node payoff comparison with deviation strategies.
In addition, we analyze the effects of hop count and channel unreliability on the through-
put. The results are shown in Figure 6.9 with δ = 0.999. It can be noted that throughput
drops when channel becomes more unreliable or hop count increases. Also, our proposed
MHPFS yields throughput performance very close to the situation where all the nodes are
unconditionally cooperative.
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Figure 6.8: Normalized data session throughput for different channel loss probability and
strategies.
The relationship of packet generation rate and throughput is presented in Figure 6.10.
δ is set to 0.99. The plots do not show much difference for different packet rates and the
throughput remains almost constant.
Last but not least, we study the effect of mobility. In this setting, pe = 0.01, δ = 0.999.
The mobility profile we use is Random WayPoint (RWP) with 5 seconds of pause in between
two consecutive moves. Figure 6.11 plots the throughput performance for two different
speeds. The results suggest that mobility introduces link break probability and decreases
the throughput for our proposed forwarding strategy.
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6.3 Attacker Detection and Coexistence
In this section, we study the properties of the perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the
malicious node detection game and the post-detection subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
derived in Chapter 5 through simulations. In our simulator, two players play the games
repeatedly; the payoffs and strategy profiles for each of the subgames are recorded to analyze
the properties of the equilibria.
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Figure 6.10: Normalized data session throughput for different packet generation rates.
6.3.1 Malicious Node Detection Game
We first present the simulation results on the malicious node detection game. In Figure 6.12,
we show how the monitoring probability in PBE strategy increases with the malicious node
attack success rate. The plots infer that the equilibrium require node j to increase its
monitoring frequency as the attack success rate increases. Also, as the channel becomes
more unreliable, node j must play Monitor more frequently.
Figure 6.13 compares the convergence of node j’s belief system when different attack
gains are presented. The plots are shown with pe = 0.01, γ = 0.95 and α = 0.01. In
Figure 6.13(a), we show how the belief system forms a correct belief on the type of node i
when only Attack is observed. The convergence of the belief system under PBE is illustrated
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Figure 6.11: Normalized data session throughput for mobile nodes.
in Figure 6.13(b). The plots suggest that the lower the attack gain is, the quicker the belief
system converges. This property can be explained as follows. A smaller attack gain requires
node i to attack more often in order to get more payoff, and increasing the attack frequency
also increases the risk of being successfully observed. With more observations, the belief is
updated more frequently and accurately. Belief system converges slower in Figure 6.13(b)
than in Figure 6.13(a) because in the PBE, instead of constantly monitoring, node j only
monitors with probability q.
A more complete study on the convergence of the belief system is shown in Figure 6.14.
Plots in Figure 6.14(a) indicate the larger the disguise cost cF/cA is, the less time it takes to
converge. This is because, with a larger disguise cost, it is unprofitable for node i to disguise
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Figure 6.12: Equilibrium strategy q vs. the attack success rate in malicious node detection
game.
by forwarding packets. Instead, it will launch more attacks, thus increasing the chances to
be identified. Figure 6.14(b) shows a quicker converged belief system for a smaller detection
gain because node j needs to monitor more often to be profitable. Figures 6.14(c) and 6.14(d)
relate the convergence with less errors and uncertainties in the system. As expected, with
errors and uncertainties (i.e., low channel loss, high attack success rate and low false alarm
rate), the belief system converges quickly.
Finally, the parameters affecting the PBE attack probability p are investigated in Fig-
ure 6.15. The attack gain is a very important factor in determining the value of p as shown in
Figure 6.15(a). A large attack gain means more payoff gained from an attack, which implies
less number of attacks are needed. Hence p should be smaller. Figures 6.15(b) and 6.15(c)
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Figure 6.13: Belief system update with different attack gains.
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Figure 6.14: Effects of parameters on belief system update.
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Figure 6.14: Effects of parameters on belief system update (cont.).
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indicate that node i should attack less frequently under a reliable channel as every attack is
more likely to be successful. However, as suggested in Figure 6.14(d), if the false alarm rate
is high for the regular node, the malicious node can take advantage of it and attack more
often.
6.3.2 Post-detection Game
After the belief system of node j converges (θi ≥ 0.99), we can safely conclude that node
j has detected the malicious node. Therefore, the post-detection game starts. To show the
continuity, at the beginning of the post detection game, node i sticks to its PBE strategy.
Figure 6.16 presents how the attack probability p∗(t) evolves to the SPNE strategy from
the PBE. It is clear in the plots that in the SPNE, node i should decrease its attack proba-
bility to avoid isolation. Figure 6.16(a) shows a larger detection gain that corresponds to a
smaller attack rate; thus in the equilibrium, the payoffs for node j will not increase due to the
large detection gain. Figure 6.16(b) states that if the channel is lossy, node i should attack
more often. The reason behind this claim is that the more unreliable the channel is, the
less probable node j can accurately observe an attack. Plots in Figure 6.16(c) are obtained
from detection gain equals to 5. This figure shows that the equilibrium is not sensitive to
the initial value and threshold of the coexistence index Ci.
The expected length of the post-detection game is shown in Figure 6.17. First, the figure
states that the less errors (i.e., less channel loss and more successful attack) in the system,
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Figure 6.15: Effects of parameters on the PBE strategy.
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Figure 6.15: Effects of parameters on the PBE strategy (cont.).
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Figure 6.16: Effects of parameters on the SPNE strategy.
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Figure 6.16: Effects of parameters on the SPNE strategy (cont.).
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Figure 6.17: Expected length of the post-detection game.
the longer the post-detection games can be played. Second, the length of the game grows
with the attack gain. This interesting phenomena can be explained in the following way.
The larger attack gain enables the malicious node to attack less while keeping its payoff high.
Thus, more often, the malicious node will play as a regular node to avoid isolation. This will
increase the time for the regular and malicious nodes to coexist. This property can be used
to extend the lifetime of the network.
Last but not least, we show how the network throughput can benefit from coexistence in
Figure 6.9. Similar observations can be made as the game length property. With a larger
attack gain, the malicious node decreases its attack rate and does more packet forwarding
as a regular node. Therefore, the malicious nodes can be utilized to increase the through-
put more often as the attack gain grows. The throughput gain property illustrates clearly
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Figure 6.18: Throughput gain.
that malicious and regular nodes can coexist, and the coexistence equilibria improve the
throughput of the network.
6.3.3 Characteristics of MPBNE
We study the characteristics of the Markov Perfect Bayes-Nash Equilibrium. In particular,
we are interested in the properties of node i’s belief update system (i.e., belief about belief)
and how the introduction of node i’s belief would affect the results we obtained in Section
6.3.1.
In Figure 6.19, we study node i’s belief system in the MPBNE. The plots are obtained
with pe = 0.01, γ = 0.95 and α = 0.05. To better show the properties of node i’s belief
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system in the MPBNE, we also present node j’s belief system. In particular, we plot µi as
node i’s belief system in MPBNE according to equation (5.48), µj as node j’s belief system
in PBE as stated in equation (5.12) and µ∗j as node j’s belief system update in the MPBNE
as a result of node i’s actions in the belief about belief model. A common observation is
that node i’s belief µi converges much faster than the belief µj in PBE, which means that
node i holds a false belief that node j can identify its malice quicker than node j actually
could. As a result of the inaccuracy in node i’s belief, it takes longer time for node j to form
a belief on node i. This is evident from the plots that show µ∗j converges much slowly than
it does in PBE, when node i does not employ any belief system.
In addition, Figure 6.19 shows some similar properties of node i’s belief system to what
we have observed in Figure 6.14. For example, Figure 6.19(b) indicates a larger detection
gain will force node i’s belief system converge quicker. Figures 6.19(c) and 6.19(d) infer that
reliable channel, high attack success rate and accurate detection (low false alarm rate) will
also induce a fast convergence of µi. However, the only discrepancy is with the disguise cost;
for node i, a high disguise cost makes update of µi slow, while for node j, a high disguise cost
helps µi converge faster. The reason lies in the inaccuracy of node i’s belief system. From
our previous discussion, it is stated that when the observed payoff is −cF , node i cannot
predict what node j’s action is. Thus, an internal error resides in node i’s belief system, and
this error is amplified when cF is large (i.e., cF , takes a high weight in the payoff), which
corresponds to a large disguise cost.
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The properties of the MPBNE strategy are further investigated in Figure 6.20. Once
again, similarity is found between Figures 6.20(a) and 6.15(a), as well as Figure 6.20(b) and
Figures 6.15(b), 6.15(c), 6.15(d). Both the MPBNE strategy attack probability, denoted
as pM and the PBE strategy attack probability in Figure 6.15 will increase with smaller
attack gain and attack success rate, as well as larger channel error rate and false alarm rate.
Moreover, it is noted that pM is smaller than what node j believes it would be (denoted as pj∗i
in the Figures 6.20(b)). In addition, pM is larger than the PBE strategy attack probability
pPBE in the first several stage games, however, as the games repeat, pM drops below pPBE. This
interesting observation implies that when node i implements the belief system, it attacks
more aggressively (than without the belief about belief model, i.e., in PBE) in the first
several games, because it believes node j is far from reaching a successful detection. As
the game unfolds, node i adjusts its attack rate to prevent from detection. The difference
between pM and pPBE also explains why node j’s belief system alters in the MPBNE as shown
in Figure 6.19.
6.3.4 Transition from Detection Game to Post-detection Games
Our discussions above are focused on how the involvement of node i’s belief system would
make the MPBNE different from the PBE. However, since the detection of the malicious
node is not the only aim of this research, we are also motivated to find the link between
the MPBNE and/or PBE in the detection game and the SPNE in the post detection game.
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Figure 6.19: Node i’s belief system update in the Markov Perfect Bayes-Nash Equilibrium.
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Figure 6.19: Node i’s belief system update in the Markov Perfect Bayes-Nash Equilibrium
(cont.).
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Figure 6.20: Effect of parameters on the Markov Perfect Bayes-Nash Equilibrium strategy.
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Figure 6.21 shows the equilibrium strategy profiles in terms of attack probability. It is clearly
evident from the plot that although in MPBNE, node i attacks less often in PBE, in order
to reach SPNE, node i still needs to further lower its attack probability. As a matter of
fact, the post-detection game is initialized by node j when its belief about node i’s malice
reaches a threshold value (µj(θi) > 0.99 in our setting). However, this information is never
revealed to node i, so that node i has no idea if the post-detection game has started or not.
When node i is also equipped with the belief system, it can make a prediction on when the
post-detection game starts based on its belief about node j’s belief. For example, if node i’s
belief µi(µj(θi)) > 0.99, node i might assume that the post-detection game has begun and
adjust its strategy profile accordingly.
Figure 6.22 examines the transition process through simulation. In our simulation, once
µi(µj(θi)) reaches 0.99, node i’s attack probability is set to be the same as the probability
in SPNE (denoted as pSPNE). Despite the change, node j still sticks to its criteria and does
not start the post-detection game until its belief crosses the threshold. In other words, in
this setting, node i deviates from the MPBNE and plays the SPNE strategy even when
node j still plays the detection game. Figure 6.22(a) shows although node i deviates from
MPBNE, the attack probability node j believes node i takes (pi∗j) and pPBE are very close.
Furthermore, Figure 6.22(b) indicates that when node i adheres to pSPNE, node j’s belief
updates are slightly slower than that in the PBE. The simulation results suggest that with
node i’s belief system, malicious node detection game and the post-detection game can be
integrated with an effective transition process.
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Figure 6.21: Comparison of node i’s strategy profiles.
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Figure 6.22: Effects of the integration of the detection and post-detection games.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Misbehavior of nodes is a big threat to the wireless network security and quality of service
provisioning. To ensure communication security, data integrity, and information fidelity,
advanced cryptographic techniques can be employed at lower layers in the network stack.
However, from a distributed system perspective, it is quite desirable that every node in the
network can participate in the process of identification and mitigation of the misbehavior.
The body of work presented in this dissertation addresses mitigating the misbehavior
in wireless networks from a game theoretic perspective. In particular, we take the packet
forwarding process as an example and discuss in detail how to stimulate and enforce every
node in the network to be cooperative. Due to the unreliable nature of the wireless channel,
the cooperation enforcement design covers both homogeneous and heterogeneous channel
conditions. In the former scenario, we derive the necessary and sufficient conditions to
achieve cooperation with various strategies. We also examine the cooperation enforcement
process with evolutionary game theory by proposing an anti-collusion game. Our analysis
shows that any strategy that resists collusion will lead to full cooperation in the network.
In the latter scenario, we model the effect of heterogeneous unreliable channel as imperfect
private monitoring in the game. We propose a state machine based strategy that ensures
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the cooperative actions are the sequential equilibrium. In addition, extensions are made to
the strategy profile so that it can also enforce cooperation in a multi-hop wireless network.
Our discussion on mitigating the misbehavior continues with the presence of malicious
attacks in the network. Since the malicious nodes bear the goal to cause harm to the network,
it does not fall into the scope of cooperation enforcement schemes. Because the malicious
node can camouflage as regular nodes when it is not attacking, we devise a Bayesian detection
game to model the malice detection process. As the detection process goes, the regular node
that monitors updates its belief on the identity of the malicious node. This problem gets
complicated when we consider the channel unreliability that affects the observation accuracy.
We further study the even more complicated problem when the countermeasures are available
to the malicious node, i.e., the malicious node can also study the games and form beliefs
about whether its identity has been revealed. Equilibrium solutions are obtained to show
the properties of the detection process. Unlike other methods that isolate the malicious
nodes upon detection, we argue that it is beneficial to keep them in the network as long as
they can be taken advantage of. Hence, we formulate a post-detection game and derive the
equilibrium that enables regular and malicious nodes to coexist. Moreover, we also obtain
the expected time when the malicious node should not be kept any longer.
Our analysis is backed by extensive simulations. The experimental study not only vali-
dates our design notion, but also shows the properties of our solutions. In the anti-collusion
game with homogeneous unreliable channel, we illustrate the effects of initial population
share, channel unreliability, and payoff matrix on the convergence of cooperation evolution.
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Under heterogeneous lossy channel scenarios, the simulation results illustrate the efficiency
of the proposed state machine based forwarding strategies. In addition, network throughput
performance is measured with respect to parameters like channel loss probability, route hop
count and mobility. Results suggest that the performance due to our proposed strategy is
in close agreement with that of unconditionally cooperative nodes. In the study of coex-
istence, through simulation, we show that the coexistence equilibrium helps to extend the
length of the games and improves the throughput of the network. Experimental results also
indicate that with the help of the proposed nested belief system, the malicious node is able
to adjust its strategy in the game and finally the detection game and post-detection game
are integrated with effective transition.
The research presented in this dissertation also serves as a starting point for future re-
search in the subject of misbehavior identification and mitigation. For example, our research
on malicious node detection game only considers single user detection, therefore, the channel
condition is invariant. In follow-up work, networked detection scheme can be designed such
that every regular node in the network can participate in the detection process and share
their observations. In a networked scenario, the channel conditions are heterogeneous and
cooperation among all regular nodes are desirable. From this perspective, the findings in
Chapter 4 might be applicable. Nonetheless, many issues remain open, e.g., the channel un-
reliability effects on the information exchange among regular nodes, the topology dynamics
when the nodes are mobile, and unbalanced data flows. Furthermore, the solutions proposed
in the research and their properties can provide insights to other similar security methods,
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because in our approach, we focus on the perspective of individual nodes and the solutions
obtained herein reach the equilibrium in the network.
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